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Sectarianism, centralized political system, and the 
failure of the state: Lebanon’s new perspective  
 
Martine Andraos 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis had demonstrated that sectarian affiliations are of a primordial nature and 
continue to determine how the Lebanese interact politically and socially with each other. 
Nevertheless, it argued that they should not be held responsible for inter-sectarian conflicts 
that have been taking place in Lebanon since the 1950s. This thesis demonstrated that the 
real cause behind these inter sectarian conflicts lies in the adoption of a consociational and 
highly centralized political system. The inability of the Lebanese political system to 
function properly did not assist in making the Lebanese sects coexist together peacefully. 
It even intensified inter-sectarian tensions, fear and lack of trust. Its failures had encouraged 
factions and groups within each sect to continuously attempt to impose, through 
illegitimate means and foreign support, their de facto rule of law over geographical 
locations where the majority of the population shared with them the same sectarian 
affiliation. This thesis concludes by proposing the replacement of consociationalism and 
centralization with a federal system. 
 
Keywords: Sectarianism, Primordialism, Political System, Centralized Political System, 
Consociational Political System, Sectarian Tension, Governmental Deadlocks, Rule of 
Law, Rights and freedoms, Militia Rule, Foreign Intervention, Federalism. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 . CASE STUDY OVERVIEW 
 
Lebanon has always been depicted as a precarious state as historically it has witnessed 
recurring civil and sectarian conflicts. This thesis aims to answer the following question: 
“What is the main reason behind the recurrent sectarian conflicts and the instability of the 
Lebanese state?” 
 This research will prove how the prevailing consociational and centralized political 
system, in light of sectarianism, primordially existing at the core of the Lebanese  political 
culture and its consequential sectarian geographical distributions in Lebanon, is 
intensifying sectarian tensions, making the Lebanese state a precarious one. Henceforth, 
this thesis will prove sectarian affiliations are deemed not to be the direct motive of 
sectarian conflicts as commonly conceived.  The cause is rather the mechanism that 
governs the relationships among the sectarian communities, and the means provided by 
the political system to regulate inter-sectarian political interactions.  
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This thesis defines Political Culture as “the system of empirical beliefs, expressive 
symbols, which defines the situation in which political actions take place”1 . It also 
considers a constitutional entity as a precarious state if this entity fails to deliver on the 
fundamentals listed in the definition of a state herein: “The ultimate benchmark of any 
constitutional structure is to provide rights and freedoms to communities as well as to 
individuals, to enforce rule of law, to maintain security domestically, and, to protect the 
country’s sovereignty2”. 
Lebanon embraces eighteen different sectarian communities in constant competition. The 
state’s social schisms emanate mainly from sectarian affiliations which proves to be an 
intrinsic primordial aspect of the Lebanese socio-political fabric, and which cannot be 
eliminated or superseded.  In the absence of consent over a unifying definition of 
sectarianism, this paper considers sectarianism as a set of shared religious beliefs, values, 
history, culture among a group of people, under the authority of religious institutions, and 
where this group of people lives in a same geographic area for long periods of time. The 
fact that sectarianism is identified as primordial in Lebanon imposes the need for 
addressing the concerns of different sectarian constituencies appropriately, so as to ensure 
their respective rights, security, stability, and equity; which in return, will build trust and 
revert into peaceful coexistence among the Lebanese communities, and therefore will 
lead to the viability of the state. 
                                                 
1 Roskin, M, Cord, R, Medeiros, J, Jones, W, Political Sciences, An Introduction. Prentice Hall, 6th. P.125 
 
2Katrib, JP, 2006, Lebanon and the federal solution. L’orient Le Jour. P.1. 
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 Although the Lebanese political system has dealt with sectarianism as a primordial 
characteristic, nevertheless, this system has failed to manage and regulate inter-
communal relations in a way that leads to peaceful coexistence among Lebanon’s sects.  
It adopted a consociational formula which granted each sectarian faction a de jure limited 
autonomy and the legal power to veto any government decision that might not be in its 
favor. It also provides a central body with primary authority to manage state’s affairs 
unanimously - regardless of the varying needs. This political system, as will be detailed 
later, has always been causing governmental deadlocks and paralysis, and thus made the 
Lebanese sects act autonomously in light of the dysfunctional state which consequently 
made it precarious. Furthermore, as will be demonstrated, this political system has always 
fallen under the political dominance of the most powerful sectarian faction. Fact that has 
prompted  members of other sects (who felt threatened by such practices), claim they are 
not fairly treated by the system and thus,  opted for illegitimate methods to protect their 
acclaimed political, social and cultural rights, by imposing a de facto dominance over a 
well-defined geographic area of their demographic dominance.   
Although political reforms to the political system were introduced by the Taif Accord in 
1990, these reforms did not integrate any constitutional change to the way sectarian 
relations are managed and did not, however, help to convince many members of Lebanese 
sects, referred to in this thesis as “non-state actors”, to interlace legitimately in the 
Lebanese entity. In our case, non-state actors are defined as organized and independent 
sectarian political actors which acquired, through national or transnational means, 
economic, political, social, and military capabilities to influence domestic and foreign 
affairs and challenge the constitutional entity.  
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As will be demonstrated, sectarian tensions in Lebanon have constantly intensified even 
after the reforms introduced by the Taif Accord were adopted. Not only did the Lebanese 
political system continue to disarm the Lebanese government from the ability to resolve 
inter-sectarian conflicts but also, it has failed to stop the Lebanese sects from acquiring 
(within geographical lines), the major component of a strong state mentioned in the 
definition above. The lack of trust in the Lebanese state and its political system to protect 
their social, political and cultural rights, drives many Lebanese sectarian communities to 
strongly believe it is their legitimate right to ensure these rights by de facto means, and 
managed to establish their own rule of law over the areas where their sect has a major 
demographic dominance. In this respect, this thesis will demonstrate that in Lebanon, 
even 25 years after the end of the war, the rule of sectarian non-state actors over well-
defined geographical areas continues to operate - a situation that is mainly due to the way 
the Lebanese political system is managing sectarian relations as argued above. The 
members of sects who have a demographic dominance over well-defined geographically 
delimitated locations,  have managed to acquire  a de facto social and political authority, 
and imposed their rule of law and order over their areas of dominance. Thus attaining the 
constituent of a functional state such as providing welfare, maintaining security, imposing 
religious and cultural practices, and carrying out independent foreign alliances and 
relationships(even in areas with mixed sectarian populations), a crystal-clear 
demographical dominance is identified.  
 
1.2 . LITERATURE REVIEW  
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Lebanon’s pluralistic society, recurrent conflicts and complex dynamic history have made 
its politics a challenging case study that divided scholars.  The novelty of this thesis is 
that it correlates between primordial sectarianism, consociational system, and the state’s 
precarious balance, and presents the political system as being the reason behind sectarian 
tensions and state failure. Conversely to usual claims, it does not consider sectarianism 
as the root problem, or as a factor to be eradicated from the Lebanese formula in order to 
achieve peace and state viability. Thus, it strongly suggests that if sectarianism is properly 
managed, it will create a constructive profitable competition between different Lebanese 
constituencies, governed by peaceful relations domestically, and will also help regulate 
foreign relations benefiting all Lebanese citizens. 
A variety of positions regarding the root of the problem behind Lebanon’s precarious 
condition - including Fawaz Traboulsi’s book “From Social Crisis to Civil War,” stating 
that sectarian conflicts are the result of social and economic inequalities3, are discussed 
in this thesis which argues that the centralized political system is unable to provide 
equitable distribution of resources, leading to sectarian tensions and struggles over power 
and authority. 
Some literature on sectarianism consider it to be a burden from which Lebanon suffers, 
perceive it as the cause for Lebanon’s turmoil and describe it as a constructed and modern 
phenomenon which can be eradicated. Those scholars perceive the ongoing turmoil as the 
result of modern deficiencies, which could be solved through institution enforcement, 
electoral engineering, application of the consociational formula, and civic activism; citing 
                                                 
3Traboulsi, F, From Social Crisis to civil War. P.12 
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Ousama Makdisi who clearly expresses the above thoughts in his article “Reconstructing 
the nation-state: the modernity of secularism Lebanon”4. Makdisi stresses that sectarian 
identities are modern and amendments in the electoral law could result in proper 
representation, and consequently, in peaceful relations between Lebanese individuals. 
Moreover, Samir Khalaf emphasizes on the primordial aspect of sectarianism. He 
believes that identity in Lebanon is not civil5, but rather primordial affiliations persisting 
through history6. Additionally, inMichael Hudson’s article “The problem of Authoritative 
Power in Lebanese Politics”, he does not relate the causes of confessional casualties to 
one aspect of Lebanon’s state-failures; he states political turmoil and instability are due 
to the mistrust of the Lebanese in each other, in their political leaders, and in the state 
instruction. Hudson considers that it is also due to the vertical political division among 
the Lebanese people which is the result of "primordial” affiliation, leading to the 
discrimination resulting in unequal social and economic development, and also to 
Lebanon being a competition arena for neighboring countries, outside parties’ 
intervention and proxy relations of some Lebanese parties to outsiders’, thus 
delegitimizing political elites7. Similarly to Makdisi, this thesis will recommend a change 
of the political system and will refute the claims that sectarian identities are modern, but 
will agree with Khalaf and Hudson by demonstrating that sectarian identities are 
primordial. 
                                                 
4Ussama, M, 1996, Reconstructing the Nation-State: The Modernity of Secularism in Lebanon.  Middle 
East Report, No. 200. P.5  
 
5Khalaf, S, 1968, Primordial Ties and Politics in Lebanon. Middle Eastern Studies. P.243 
6 Ibid, P.244 
 
7 Hudson, M, “The problem of Authoritative Power in Lebanese Politics”. P.22 
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In his book Peace and War in Lebanon, and pertaining to the correlation of the political 
system and the primordial affiliations, Bassam Namani quotes David and Audrey Smock 
who claim sectarianism is an impediment to political reform 8 . Samir Khalaf 
acknowledges the need for a change; however, he states that the trial of eliminating 
confessionalism, (which he clearly describes as unrealistic), would result in instigating 
sectarian division. Khalaf thus suggests the reform of the system9 as an alternative. On 
another note, there are scholars who admit that the root cause behind continuous conflicts 
lies at a deeper level: that of a divided political culture, divergent identities, and a 
discrepancy in belonging and affiliation. Halim Barakat considers Lebanon a mosaic 
society rather than a pluralistic one10, thus aggravating the aspect of the sectarian diversity 
that integrationists and advocates of a unitary state in Lebanon have been trying to 
disregard. According to Vatikotis, a state characterized by a pluralistic society is subject 
to conflicts given the divergent interests, suspicions and aims of its various 
constituencies. In order to manage conflicts and avoid violent hostilities, these 
constituencies should be integrated in a national communeand, institutions responsible 
for preserving the national law, should be enforced11.  Consequently, the political system 
which oversees these institutions should be given the capabilities to control, coordinate 
and contain pluralism. This thesis will stress on the importance of amending the political 
                                                 
8Namani, B, 2015, Peace and War in Lebanon. Dar Nelson. P.5 
 
9Khalaf, S, 1968, Primordial Ties and Politics in Lebanon. Middle Eastern Studies. P.263 
 
10Barakat, H, 1973, Social and Political Integration in Lebanon: The Case of Social Mosaic. Middle East 
Journal. P.2 
 
11Vatikotis, P.J., 1984, The crisis of Lebanon: A Local Historical Perspective. The World Today. P.3 
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system in furtherance of embracing sectarian diversity, and therefore preventing 
hostilities and governmental deadlocks. 
 
13. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: PRIMORDIALISM 
Three approaches are to be considered while tackling matters of identity: 
Instrumentalism, Constructivism, and Primordialism. This thesis adopts Primordialism 
because it provides the best framework for this case study. 
 
13.1. INSTRUMENTALISM 
The Instrumentalist theory regards identity as a means of attaining objectives and as 
resources used to favor political interest12 and attain material leverage.   Instrumentalism, 
considers that “cultural trends are subject to prompt alteration. It believes that integration 
of a variety of constituencies is highly facilitated by industrialization, communication, 
and urbanization”13. Although instrumentalism accounts for identities however, it does 
not address the non-rational, ‘emotional depth of (sectarian) identity”. This approach is 
thus an economistic approach which puts weight on the economic interests of a faction - 
rather than on identity as such, and perceives identity as a circumstantial alternative.  
                                                 
12Hutchinson, J, Smith, A, 1996,  Ethnicity. Oxford University Press. P.33 
 
13Hanf, T, 1993, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon. The center for Lebanese studies.P.15 
9 
 
Further from the economistic view of the instrumental approach, primordialism and 
constructivism integrate emotional affiliation and societal association, with an aim to 
elaborate on the ties upon which the unity of group identities is based. 
 
13.2. CONSTRUCTIVISM 
 
Constructivism claims that identities are constructed and reconstructed based on criteria 
with which individuals identify. These identities are multi-dimensional as they vary and 
are subject to change. Such dynamic and fluid identities are behind social revolutionizing 
and political change. The constructivist approach is relevant when analyzing the cultural 
differences between different constituencies as it considers social factors, such as gender, 
religion, norms, values and culture, in order to explain the differences in views and 
thinking of entities.  However, Social Constructivism “offers no predictions about 
enduring regularities or tendencies in world politics. Instead, it suggests how to 
investigate them”14 which means that Social Constructivism can explain a situation, but 
fails to make predictions whether or not a solution can be found.  
Aligned with the above claims, Benedict Anderson, who defines the nation as "an 
imagined political community and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”15, 
also acknowledges the dynamic nature of identities and the consequential encounter of 
                                                 
14Baylis, J, Smith, S, 2006, The Globalization of World Politics – An Introduction to International 
Relations. Oxford University Press. P.268 
 
15 Beatty, R, 1999, Review Essay: Primordialism Versus Constructivism. The National Project. P.3 
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communal groups,  which are mainly affected by varying circumstances, and the group’s 
"active involvement in the construction and reconstruction of identities, negotiating 
boundaries, asserting meanings, interpreting their own pasts, resisting the impositions of 
the present, and claiming the future”16. 
Although Anderson's description of the nation is concise and highlights its origins, 
however, it does not determine the time or spatial frame for reconstruction nor provides 
evidence on how to differentiate one community from another, nor does it establish 
boundaries for communities start and end. 
From the above, we conclude that Instrumentalism and Constructivism do not explain 
why many identities remained unchanged throughout history. Additionally, they do not 
provide evidence justifying why many political systems failed to incite people to surpass 
these identities of religious, sectarian, cultural, or ethnic nature, nor why attempts to 
construct identities embracing a variety of sub-identities failed to deliver.  
 
133.  PRIMORDIALISM 
 
As some attachments appear to emanate from a spiritual state of mind rather than from 
social dynamics, this thesis uses the Primordialist Approach as a theoretical framework 
to study the relationship between primordial sectarianism, consociational political 
system, sectarian conflict, and the precarious Lebanese state. The Primordialist Approach 
is used to study identities, including sectarian identities, and hence, can best explain the 
                                                 
16 Beatty, R, 1999, Review Essay: Primordialism Versus Constructivism. The National Project. P.3 
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Lebanese case.  However, as sectarian identities will always influence people’s political 
choices and behaviour, and in this manner, according to our political system, a consensus 
is a prerequisite to decision making, the Lebanese government is constantly facing 
deadlocks and the inability to take actions. This thesis will argue that the primordialist 
nature of sectarianism, where sectarian identities cannot be constructed or reconstructed 
or cannot be eliminated, will induce us to conclude that the current Lebanese political 
system will always lead to sectarian tensions and conflicts, and will not allow the 
Lebanese state to overcome its failures. 
Primordialism is defined as “deep emotional attachments to the group, supplying an 
internal gyroscope and cognitive map through which the social world is perceived, and 
historicizes selfhood in a web of primordial cultural meanings”17. 
The Primordialist Approach claims that identities are fixed and cannot be changed, 
replaced or reconstructed. They are there to stay and will always influence the behavior 
of people and therefore they are unlikely to be outdated18 . Primordialism considers 
nations and religious groups to have a primordial origin. As Edward Shils states,  
“The term primordial is employed here in the conventional sense to 
encompass ties of religion and all such congruities of blood, personal and 
sacred affinities which suffice to note that it has far-reaching implications 
for the political life in the country. However, primordial ties and loyalties 
                                                 
17 Beatty, R, 1999. Review Essay: Primordialism Versus Constructivism. The National Project. P.1 
 
18Hanf, T, 1993, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon. The center for Lebanese Studies. P.15 
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are not, as often assumed, impediments to national solidarity and political 
unity”19. 
Primordialism is built upon the claims hereafter:  (1) identities are constructed around 
shared societal resemblance such as kinship ties, (2) identities are established and 
unchangeable once constructed, (3) identities are enhanced inter-group conflicts and 
challenges, (4) as humans assign an overwhelming significance to their kinship ties, 
identities acquire an unquestionable influence on behavioral patterns20.    
Primordial ties emanate from givens such as assumed blood ties, race, language, region, 
religion, and custom, which are natural, spiritual, underived, ineffable, thus “binding in 
and of themselves”21. 
Shills argues that “modern society is held together by an affinity of personal attachments, 
moral obligations in concrete contexts, professional and creative pride, individual 
ambition, primordial affinities and a civil sense”22.   
Harold Isaac acknowledges that there is a global leaning towards defragmentation and 
that bets on modernization, civilizing movements, or enlightenment to flatten the world 
are pointless. As Humans turn out to be unable to live together, identity develops as a tool 
for power.  These identities which bond communities together are fixed and durable, 
                                                 
19Shils, E, 1957, Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil ties. British journal of Sociology pp. 130-45; 
Geertz, C, ibid. P.105 
20 Bayar, M, 2009, Reconsidering Primordialism: An Alternative Approach To The Study Of Ethnicity. 
Ethnic and Racial Studies. P.1643 
 
21Eller, J, Coughlan, R, in Hutchinson, J, & Smith, A, 1996, Ethnicity. Oxford University Press. P.45 
 
22 Bayar, M, 2009, Reconsidering Primordialism: An Alternative Approach To The Study Of Ethnicity. 
Ethnic and Racial Studies. P.1641 
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however, dynamic. Additionally, he clarifies that “the functions that identity performs 
and secures to the individual, in its linkage to the group, in meeting the needs of 
connection and belonging, explain the powerful persistence of primordial affinities and 
the lasting power of attachments”23. 
As we aim to enhance humanity, distinctiveness must be guaranteed. The conflict lies not 
in the differences themselves, but rather in the formula allowing one to rule the other. 
Henceforth, and to achieve peace, new pluralism, and institutions, systems should be 
built, capable of embracing the conflicting trends of globalization with the risks of 
divisions the world is subject to24.  
 
1.4 METHODOLOGY 
This study will allow for an assessment of the influence of the political system and its 
outcomes.  It will also highlight the causal relationship between the nature of the 
Lebanese society (which is highly divided along sectarian lines, as previously 
demonstrated), and the consociational and centralized political system applied, to then 
evaluate the viability and failure of the state. Through a case study approach, based on 
research and on empirical evidence, this thesis aims to understand the complex issue of 
the Lebanese situation using previous research and findings.  
                                                 
23 Beatty, R, November 1999, Review Essay: Primordialism versus constructivism. The National Project. 
P.2 
 
24 Ibid, P.2 
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In order to prove that the problem behind Lebanon’s state failure lies in the political 
system which is unable to manage sectarian pluralism, and not, as conceived, in 
sectarianism per se, we will start by demonstrating the primordial aspect of sectarianism 
in Lebanon. For this purpose, we will look for factors that prove how sectarianism has 
always prevailed and could not be superseded. We will also highlight how aspects of 
Lebanon’s political culture are challenged by unachievable consent on fundamentals such 
as political affiliations, political identity, political formula and the educational system. 
We will then describe the features of the consociational and centralized formulas of the 
political system. Following this, we will assess the functionality of the state and focus on 
how this political system is intensifying sectarian tension, and is generating fear and lack 
of trust among the Lebanese sects.  Consequently prompting them to either use their de 
jure veto power to block governmental decisions, or exploit their de facto power to protect 
what they consider as their legitimate right.   
Thereafter, we will then prove how the Lebanese state lacks the components of a strong 
constitutional entity. We will look into: rights and freedoms, legitimacy and rule of law, 
independence, security, and sovereignty. Subsequently, we will probe deeper into how 
many sectarian factions have strived to achieve a certain degree of authority, and prove 
how each sectarian community delivers on the features of the definition of a strong state. 
We will be looking at how sects have managed to impose their de facto authority and 
their own socio-political ideologies and values on minorities within respective areas; how 
it has acquired de facto military power and developed its own foreign policies and 
alliances; and how it acts as a proxy of foreign actors on the Lebanese territory. 
15 
 
Lastly, we will highlight how each faction is exercising its power to rule within the 
geographical area where it has the predominant sectarian majority. Consequently, this 
thesis will conclude that, under its current formula, the Lebanese state will not be able to 
root out sectarian tensions. We will answer our research question by stating that the 
solution to the state-failure is not by trying to eradicate sectarianism, but rather by 
designing a political system which embraces the diversity of Lebanon, contains the 
disagreements of each sect on domestic issues, and achieves consent on the position of 
Lebanon pertaining to foreign issues. Lastly, we will recommend a change in the political 
system that is crucial in order to achieve the Lebanese state’s viability and preserve its 
unity. We will propose Federalism as a solution and will justify our choice based on the 
current irreversible de facto situation. 
In order to empirically address my research problem, we will consult a wide range of 
related literature reviews, books, internet articles, case studies, and narratives that have 
been published onLebanon’s social and political diversity, and political system.  
 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
CHAPTER II 
PRIMORDIAL SECTARIANISM AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
This second chapter claims that identities are primordial, highlights the materialization 
and impact of this sectarianism on Lebanon’s politics, as well as the weight these have in 
triggering sectarian conflicts. It will also overview fundamentals upon which Lebanese 
have been unable to achieve consent and will highlight other practical manifestations of 
primordial affiliations, it will conclude that sectarianism is in fact deeply embedded in 
the Lebanese fabric and is a reality which cannot be eliminated or superseded. It is a given 
in the Lebanese equation that molds the socio-political behavior of the Lebanese. 
To evaluate the depth of sectarian cleavage between the Lebanese factions, and in 
reference to Halim Barakat, we can distinguish two forms of heterogeneous culture: the 
"pluralistic society” and the "mosaic society”. Pluralism represents rather a relationship 
based on mutual agreement of different communal welfare in a society that is harmonious 
and united.  In a pluralistic society, fairness among different groups is respected and not 
one specific group has monopoly or domination over the others. A consensus on 
fundamental principles is achieved and provisions are made in order to ensure a fairly 
balanced participation, and a fairly balanced distribution of rewards and powers among 
the groups of which it is composed. This results in some kind of harmonious relationships 
17 
 
of different interests, sects and groups within a unified social arrangement. On the other 
hand, in a mosaic society, although provisions are made concerning the introduction of 
some system of checks and balances among its groups, there still remains no consensus 
on fundamental issues facing these groups 25 .Consequently, Barakat considers the 
Lebanese society is rather  mosaic than plural consisting of various sectarian groups.  
The purpose of this chapter is therefore to demonstrate that almost 70 years after the 
establishment of Lebanon, the Lebanese are still divided along sectarian lines, and their 
sectarian identities are still the main drive behind any of their socio-political behavior. 
Henceforth, primordial sectarian bonds are diligently embedded in political practices26. 
 
2.1. FUNDAMENTALS 
The following will examine fundamentals upon which the Lebanese have failed to 
achieve consensus, in order to highlight the impact of primordial sectarian identities on 
Lebanon’s political course, and reiterate that sectarian affiliations are an unchangeable 
fact and  a given in the Lebanese equation. 
2.1.1. POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS 
                                                 
25Barakat, H, 1973, Social and Political Integration in Lebanon: A Case of Social Mosaic. Middle East 
Journal, Vol. 27, No. 3. P.3 
 
26Khalaf, S, 1968, Primordial Ties and Politics in Lebanon. Middle Eastern Studies. P.244 
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A first fundamental to look into is Political Affiliations. Two criteria are included in this 
analysis. The First is Political Parties and the Second is Media. This sub-part aims at 
proving that political affiliations are rather sectarian than national.  
2.1.1.1. Political Parties 
Political parties are defined as a “group of people united by shared political preferences 
and a general ideological identity, organized for the purpose of winning governmental 
power”27, and have become “the manifestation of the social and other cleavages that 
animated society at large”28. 
In his article on cultural diversity and sectarian attitudes in postwar Lebanon, Simon 
Haddad refers to Gurr’s definition of a group: “a psychological community whose core 
members share a distinctive and enduring collective identity based on cultural traits or 
life ways that matters to them or to others with whom they interact”29, and then quotes 
Ross who states that “we should regard individual identity as possible only in the context 
of secure group attachments”30. 
Accordingly, we consider that Lebanon’s political parties are an expression of sectarian 
primordial affiliations which have been discussed above. Political parties in Lebanon 
revolve around a nationalist; ethno-religious ideology31.  If we look at the political map 
                                                 
27Heywood, A,  Politics. Palgrave Macmillan. Third Edition. P.272  
 
28Ibid, P.273 
 
29Haddad, S, 2002, Cultural Diversity and Sectarian Attitude in Post War Lebanon. Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies. P.294 
 
30 Ibid 
31Sensenig-Dabbous, E, 2009,  The Lebanese Political Party System. Middle East Political and 
Economics Institute. P.3  
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of Lebanon, we notice that the most powerful political parties are sectarian groups. In 
addition, we discover, through monitoring the number of parliamentary seats, that secular 
parties were weakened and disappeared gradually due to a decreasing popularity. 
Examples of such parties are the Communist Party and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party 
SSNP.  Listed below is a compilation of the major political actors, organized into political 
parties, which memberships are exclusively sectarian32: 
➢ Phalange – Kataeb Party  
Established in 1936 by Maronite Pierre Gemayel, the Kataeb party is a socio-democratic 
party which has played a major role in Lebanese Politics since its founding. Pledging 
complete affiliation to Lebanon as an independent entity, it advocates Christians rights 
from independence to civil war (during which it had major political and military 
influence), the post war era, and post Syrian occupation. Currently headed by Samy 
Gemayel, it is represented by 5 parliamentary members who won their seats in 2009 and 
holds 3 ministerial portfolios in Tamam Salam’s cabinet since 2013.   Its areas of 
influence are predominantly Christian areas, mainly the Metn and Achrafieh areas, with 
growing influence in areas such as Keserouane, Byblos, Batroun, and Koura. 
 
 
 
➢ Progressive Socialist Party 
                                                 
32 NOW Media, 10/05/2008, https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/archive/Whos-who42129 
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Established by Prominent Druze leader Kamal Jumblat and whose leadership was 
inherited by his son Walid Jumblat.  The Progressive Socialist Party PSP is a Druze-
dominated party. It has participated in the Lebanese Civil War as one of the militias on 
the battle ground. Its areas of influence are the Chouf, Alley and Jabal. In 2009, PSP won 
12 parliamentary seats. 
 
➢ Amal Movement 
Amal is a Shiite-dominated movement, led by parliament speaker Nabih Berri, which also 
was a main actor in Lebanon’s civil war. It is a close ally of Hezbollah. Initially a militia, 
it gained political influence and power gradually. In 2009, it won 13 parliamentary seats. 
Its areas of influence are predominantly Shiites areas in Beirut Southern Suburb, Bekaa, 
and South.     
 
➢ Lebanese Forces Party 
Founded as the military wing of the Phalange-Kataeb party, the Lebanese Forces LF 
established for itself a political presence in 2005 when it won 5 parliamentary seats, and 
expanded its presence in 2009 with 8 seats. Lead by Samir Geagea, the LF membership 
is exclusively Christian. Its areas of influence are predominantly Christian areas in Mount 
Lebanon, and mainly Bechare areas in northern Lebanon. 
 
 
 
➢ Islamic Group ( Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyah) 
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Established in 1964 in Tripoli with the rise of Nasserism, the Islamic Group is a radical 
Sunni Lebanese wing of the Muslim Brotherhood. It aims at applying the Shari’a Law in 
Lebanon. It has always been a popular movement among Sunni’s and, in 2009; it gained 
political power through one seat in the parliament after an alliance with the Future 
Movement.  
 
➢ Marada Movement 
Initially established in 1967 as a militia, the Marada movement is Christian dominated, 
headed by Suleiman Frangieh, which main area of influence is Zghorta in North of 
Lebanon. It has always been very popular and influential and always had a presence in 
either the government or the cabinet.  It has won 3 parliamentary seats in 2009. 
 
➢ Hezbollah 
Hezbollah was established in 1984 as a major militia in Lebanon’s civil war. It is a Shiite-
dominated political party led by secretary general Hassan Nassrallah and supported 
militarily, financially and politically by Iran. It is a primary ally to the Amal movement 
domestically, and supports the Syrian regime. It was the only militia to keep its arms after 
the Taif Accord. It won 12 seats in the 2009 parliamentary elections. Its areas of influence 
are predominantly Shiites areas in Beirut’s Southern Suburb, Bekaa, and the South.     
 
 
➢  Future Movement 
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Established after the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005, the Future 
Movement FM is a Sunni-Majority Movement, headed by Saad Hariri, and which areas 
of influence are West Beirut, Akkar, Tripoli, and Saidon. FM participated for the first 
time in parliamentary elections in 2005 when it won 36 seats, and then in 2009, when it 
won 30 seats33. 
 
➢ Free Patriotic Movement 
Established in 2005 after the return of General Michel Aoun from Exile, the Free Patriotic 
Movement FPM that moved from being an opponent of the Syrian Regime and Hezbollah 
in 2005 to becoming their ally in 2006, is a Christian-dominated movement with an 
influence in predominantly Christian areas like Metn and Keserouane. In 2009, it won the 
largest number of Christian parliamentary seats.  
 
The above overview of political parties mirrors how Lebanese choose to support parties 
which represent their sectarian affiliations. Although the current division is rather 
between Sunni’s 14 March coalition (FM, LF, Kataeb) and Shiite 8 March coalition 
(SSNP, PSP, Amal, Hezbollah, FPM, Marada), and where Christians are divided between 
the two sides,  it will be demonstrated, in issues pertaining to identity and communal 
security, Christians have unified positions.  
                                                 
33Sensenig-Dabbous, E, 2009, The Lebanese Political Party System. Middle East Political and Economics 
Institute. P.2 
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Media is one additional indicator which we will be over viewing below and upon which 
an analysis of political affiliations can be based. 
 
2.1.1.2. Media 
TV channels and newspapers have adopted stances of respective political parties, and 
offer them platforms for mobilization. The table below shows the “ownerships” or 
“partnerships” between political parties, TV’s, and Newspapers. The support provided by 
the media to respective political parties is mainly sectarian driven. 
Table 2.1.1.2: Sectarian Media34 
Sectarian 
Affiliation 
TV Channel News Paper Radio 
Christian MTV,  
LBC,  
OTV 
Al-Joumhouriya, 
 Al-Anwar 
SawtLoubnan,  
Al-Mada,  
Sawt El-Ghad 
Druze   Al-Anbaa’   
Shiite NBN,  
Al-Manar 
Al-Amal   
Sunni Future TV Al-Moustaqbal, Al-Chark 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34Salloukh, B, Barakat, R, Al-Habbal, J, Khattab, L, Mikaelian, S, 2015, “The Politics Of Sectarianism In 
Postwar Lebanon”. Pluto Press. P.139 
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2.1.2. POLITICAL IDENTITY 
One other major fundamental upon which Lebanese have been divided along sectarian 
lines is their Political Identity, having at its core their perception of Lebanon’s position 
within the larger system, and which has a direct implication on Lebanon’s sovereignty. 
In his book Politics, Andrew Heywood explains that identity insinuates differentiation, 
and consequently, recognition of differences determines our “sense of identity”. 
Henceforth, the concept of “politics of recognition” revolves around the preservation of 
differences35.   
The discrepancies in sectarian identities witnessed amongst Lebanese have led to 
divergent political views, mainly pertaining to Lebanon’s position within the larger 
international system and the component of Lebanese nationalism. 
The logic of Nationalism defines a state as a “natural entity, with its different regions 
forming a single whole, which not only is, but ought to be politically united”36. Yet, the 
Lebanese state does not conform to the notion of Nationalism.  It is also not “natural” as 
it was shaped by historical events and human decisions in a defined space and time. It is 
an artificial entity considered either as a unit part of a large Arab whole by some, or as a 
whole that includes smaller diversified units by others37. 
                                                 
35Heywood, A, Politics. Pelgrave third edition. P.212 
 
36Hourani, A, 1985, Political Society in Lebanon: A historical Introduction. Centre for Lebanese Studies. 
P.3 
37Hourani, A, 1985, Political Society in Lebanon: A historical Introduction. Centre for Lebanese Studies. 
P.4 
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After the Ottoman Empire collapsed, the Middle East was remodeled and Greater 
Lebanon was declared in 1920 as an independent state including, alongside the previously 
known “Mont Lebanon”,   the ports of Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon, and the Bekaa valley. In 
1926, a constitution text defined Lebanon as a presidential, sectarian state, thus founding 
a new type of system by the colonial powers38.The National Pact of 1943 which came to 
reorganize the relationship between the different sectarian factions of the Lebanese 
society, was a fait-accompli imposed on Lebanese citizens, which failed to locate a 
national base, and which divided power among elites of different sects39. Although the 
National Pact aimed at bridging the differences between Christians and Muslims, yet not 
all Lebanese perceived the Pact similarly. To some, it was a national religious 
integrationist formula; to others, it was a power-sharing agreement that sought 
coexistence. A third view considered the Pact as a guarantee of the economic interest of 
a segment over the other.  Farid EL-Khazen quotes in this regard “Mass'udDaher who 
argues that the National Pact reflects an overlap between confessional and economic 
strata interests. Such an interpretation also means dissociation from “true Arabism” and 
creates a situation of total economic dependency on the imperialist West. This reasoning 
reflects the predominant leftist reading of the National Pact on the eve of the 1975-76 
war”40. Although all segments showed the will to achieve a common identity through this 
Pact, however, each had their own vision of “what Lebanon should be”. 
                                                 
38Harik, I, 1990, The Origins of the Arab State System in Giacomo Luciani, ed., The Arab State. 
Routelage. P.4 
 
39Makdisi, U, 1996, Reconstructing the Nation-State: The Modernity of Secularism in Lebanon. Middle 
East Report, No. 200. P.12 
 
40El-Khazen, F, 1991, The Communal Pact of National Identities. Centre for Lebanese Studies. P. 34    
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The Maronite view Lebanon as a Christian state associated with the Christians west; the 
Sunni view it as an Arab country; as for the Druze, the Shiites and the Palestinians, each 
had their own aspirations41. 
As discussed by thinkers like Charles Malik, the notion of an “eternal and everlasting 
Lebanon” has marked the Christians’ politics and was adopted by parties like the Kataeb 
Party, National Bloc, and National Liberals Party. They consider Lebanon to be an 
independent entity and aspire for its full sovereignty and completeness. Contrary to that 
notion of the eternity of Lebanon, Muslim Lebanese believe that Lebanon of 1920 is a 
temporary formula and they never acknowledged its independence from a larger Arab 
entity. Such views were clearly expressed by the Head of The Progressive Socialist Party 
PSP who considered that a Lebanese nation does not exist, instead, defines it as an Arab 
nation42.  
Although the Taif Agreement of 1990 marks the end of 15 years of sectarian hostilities, 
and aimed at incarnating national reconciliation, however, it founded Lebanese 
citizenship on sectarian identities, thus enhancing sectarian nationalism. Consequently, 
Lebanese have not agreed on a sole identity for Lebanon yet, a fact affirmed by Michael 
Hudson who highlights the intra-sectarian division that is becoming stronger afterTaif43. 
                                                 
41Hourani, A, 1985, Political Society in Lebanon: A historical Introduction. Centre for Lebanese Studies. 
P.11 
 
42Barakat, H, 1973, Social and Political Integration in Lebanon: A Case of Social Mosaic. Middle East 
Journal, Vol. 27, No. 3. P.305 
 
43Haddad, S, 2002, Cultural Diversity and Sectarian Attitude in Post War Lebanon. Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration studies.P.294 
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They also have not acquiesced on a unifying position for Lebanon within the larger 
system, as will be discussed later in this thesis. 
Muslims considered the Accord as a guarantee of an equitable balance; Christians 
believed that it was an attempt of marginalization through which they lost their political 
weight. Quoting Khachan, “it would be injudicious to refer to the Lebanese as 
people…the inhabitants of this country are merely a plurality of people – or so it seem -  
having little or nothing in common to warrant the establishment of a viable state”44 
  
In Lebanon, the socio-political and cultural alterations were founded on dynamics, having 
at their core, sectarian affiliations 45 . Lebanese nationalism has been challenged by 
sectarian loyalties as the Lebanese citizen has sub-national loyalties rather than national. 
According to Michael Hudson, these sub-national loyalties resulted in wide divisions and 
created a society embracing autonomous constituencies, each owning a veto power46. 
Economic segregation such as belonging to a certain class can be flexible as the individual 
can adapt more or less easily to the shifting between classes, however, particularistic 
affiliations are somehow rigid and prove to be difficult to surmount.47 
                                                 
44Haddad, S, 2002, Cultural Diversity and Sectarian Attitude in Post War Lebanon. Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration studies.P.293 
 
45Khalaf, S, 2003, On Roots and Rotes: The reassertion of Primordial Ties in Samir Khalaf, Theodor 
Hanf, Nawaf Salam, Lebanon in Limbo: Postwar Society and State in an Uncertain Regional 
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46Barakat, H, 1973, Social and Political Integration in Lebanon: A Case of Social Mosaic. Middle East 
Journal, Vol. 27, No. 3. P.309 
 
47Azar, E, Haddad, R, 1986, Lebanon: An Anomalous Conflict?. Third World Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 4. 
P.3 
28 
 
One cannot but notice that Lebanese constituencies have loyalties to external actors who 
belong to their respective sects; and these loyalties surpasses their loyalty to their 
homeland Lebanon.  
To better highlight the sectarian loyalties that overcome the national loyalties, we will 
refer to the Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadi Nijad's visit to Lebanon in 2010. 
Hezbollah's supporters were all mobilized to cheer for Iran's president. The Shiite 
community, represented by Hezbollah and Amal leadership broke the protocol when 
Speaker Nabih Berri received the Iranian President instead of the Lebanese President 
doing so - claiming it was the Iranian’s protocol48.  Such practices prove that the Shiites 
community affiliate with, and have more respect to the Iranian president than the 
Lebanese.  
Another surprising incident took place in March 2012 during a March 14 event during 
which, it mobilized its supporters in Martyr Square and where a series of speeches were 
delivered. As soon as FM MP Saad Hariri took the stage, a poster of KSA’s’s king was 
displayed on the wall of a nearby building. Such a move from the FM shows that loyalties 
to KSA go beyond a simple political allegiance. 
 
2.1.3. POLITICAL SYSTEM AND AUTHORITY 
Throughout history and bound by its composition, Lebanon has long lent itself to a 
uniquely devised formulae or political expression. The separateness and distinctiveness 
                                                 
48NOW Media, 15/10/2010, 
https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/nownews/national_bloc_ahmadinejad_made_lebanon_an_arena_of_confro
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it displays in the region comes from a combination of unique geographical, sociological 
structure, and intrinsic communal pluralism49.  
2.1.3.1 Political System 
Lebanese have different historical perceptions; each religious faction has its own political 
aspirations50 and set of fears. Muslims are concerned with their legitimate, socio-political 
disequilibrium, while Christians have existential fears embedded in demographic and 
geographic considerations51. 
In his survey, Simon Haddad interrogates a sample of Lebanese from different sectarian 
backgrounds. The main question was “What is the single most important characteristic of 
the Lebanese political system”. The results confirmed that Lebanese saw “a lack of 
political and social integration at the national level among Lebanon’s various cultural and 
religious groups”52.  This interpretation of the Lebanese’ people’s cohesion has been 
translated into diverging preferences of the type of political system that best suits 
“Lebanon”; in other words, that which serves best the interest of each sectarian constancy. 
Haddad thus quotes Phares who claims that Christians have expressed fears that can only 
disappear under a federal system, and concludes in his study that Druze prefer a secular 
                                                 
49Malek, H, 1997, Between Damascus and Jerusalem. Lebanon and Middle East Peace. The Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy. P.7 
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system, Shiites aim at reforming  the current system which is mandated by the Taif 
Accord, while Sunnis aspire for rather a market oriented economic system53.  
Discrepancies of political aspirations, fear, and lack of trust have not only driven 
preferences pertaining to the political system, but have also impacted public policies such 
as the electoral law - mainly the issues of eligible electoral age and expatriates votes. 
These policies are considered to be the legitimate channels through which each sectarian 
faction attains a degree of authority. 
 
2.1.3.2 Electoral Law 
➢ Eligible Electoral Age 
Eligible electoral age has always been an issue of conflict between sects. The Christians 
do not approve lowering the voting age to 18 because it will create a disequilibrium since 
the number of Muslim voters will increase to become much larger than that of the 
Christian. The overall change is that the proportion of Muslim voters rises from 60% to 
61% while the proportion of Christian voters falls from 40% to 39%". Lowering the 
voting age would require a change in the constitution, requiring two-thirds of both the 
cabinet and parliament to approve. 
Amal, Hezbollah and the PSP support this change, the FPM is against it, the FM has not 
stated a clear decision, while the Kataeb party and the LF refused it54.  
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➢ Expatriates Voting 
Similar to the conflict regarding the eligible voters’ age, expats voting is also an issue 
that translated into sectarian confrontation. The Christians believe that the majority of the 
Lebanese diaspora share a similar vision of Lebanon and consequently, would support 
their participation in the voting process. In opposition, the Shiite are not very keen about 
this matter because in many places in the world Hezbollah is accused of terrorism. 
Therefore, they would not be allowed to campaign. On another note, the demographic 
equilibrium will also impact the result as the Lebanese diaspora is mainly Christian.   
Primordial sectarianism has not only been translated in conflicts over fundamentals, but 
it has also had repercussions on Lebanon’s educational system.  
 
2.2. WILLINGNESS TO DRAW A UNIFYING EDUCATIONAL 
SYSTEM 
Educational systems are the basis upon which a collective memory is built, and a sense 
of citizenship is achieved. In Lebanon, attempts at drawing a unified “statement” of 
Lebanon’s history and defining rights of citizens have all failed. Hence, we find a large 
loophole in Lebanon’s educational system. 
Among conflicts where mismanaged primordial sectarian affiliations are translated, is the 
conflict regarding the unified “history book”. In an attempt to construct a national identity 
that could transcend sectarian divisions, the Taif accord mandated the drafting of a unified 
history book to be taught in the Lebanese schools. An attempt was made under the 
32 
 
mandate of Premier Najib Mikati. In 2012, the government appointed a committee to draft 
the book whose members are partisans of March 8 coalition, including Shiite Hezbollah 
and Amal, in addition to Christian Marada Movement and the Free Patriotic Movement. 
They had no sooner submitted the version to the parliament than protest movements arose 
against the adoption of the version. Protests were mainly initiated by Christian parties 
who considered the version to be biased, favoring Muslim communities.  Hence, currently 
there is an evident inability to draft a unified history book as each sectarian faction has 
its own version of history where primordial sectarian affiliations enhanced by unhealed 
wounds are a primary determinant. The history book issue is just an additional instance 
which depicts how deep the sectarian division is among Lebanese, and how sectarian 
affiliations supersede any other affiliation. 
 
The above chapter demonstrates how primordial sectarianism which characterizes 
Lebanon’s social fabric is translated in the supremacy of sub-loyalties over national 
loyalties.  An unachievable consent on fundamentals refers to the incapability to build a 
unifying identity, an inconsistent set of changing political formulas, and the inability to 
draw a cohesive educational system. As these primordial loyalties materialized in violent 
political behavior, the following chapter will argue that primordial affiliations are not the 
direct cause behind these phenomena, but rather, the political system that regulates these 
primordial sectarian affiliations. 
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CHAPTER III 
POLITICAL SYSTEM - THE GENERAL CONCEPT 
AND THE LEBANESE FORMULA. 
 
3.1. THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 
The major objectives of any constitutional structure is “to enforce rule of law, to maintain 
security domestically, to provide basic rights to communities as well as to individuals, 
and, to protect the country’s sovereignty”55. The state, being formed of people, territory, 
and political system, the latter is an enduring structure defined by a constitution which is 
“a set of rules, legally established or extralegal, by which a government conducts its 
affairs”56. The constitution, which regulates the correlation between people, territory, and 
political system, is thus the framework within which the state delivers its responsibilities.  
It is important to acknowledge that a political system is formed of a set of institutions and 
social structures, which respective role is the performance of a specific function57.  As 
Marion Levy claims, for a system to be categorized of a specific nature, it has to carry 
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out specific tasks and functions having at their core that particular nature58.  Aligned with 
the ultimate objective of a state, we identify the prerequisites hereafter that fall under the 
aspired outputs of a political system.  
First is state empowerment59, by which a state acquires an official jurisdiction over a well-
defined territory. The source of state empowerment is the people. Consequently, this 
prerequisite is crucial for establishing legitimacy as it institutes the trust of the people in 
their state, and, ascertains the capabilities of the state to enforce rule of law.  
Second is establishment of national principals, mainly the identity of the state. This 
prerequisite regulates state/individual relationship, and is essential for guaranteeing the 
civic and human values such as, but not limited to “freedom of expression, freedom of 
religious worship, freedom of assembly, and freedom of movement”60, in addition to the 
fundamental rights, socio-economic, cultural and welfare rights such as the right to 
education, healthcare, work… This prerequisite is however very notorious especially in 
plural and mosaic societies as it sets forth the basis of either an imposed sense of national 
identity that transcends the diversity and represses freedoms, or a sense of distinctiveness 
within the larger state, and thus protects liberties.      
Third is the sanctification of government’s institutions. This includes clarifying the 
division of power, determining the role of the central government, the executive, the 
legislative, the judiciary, and the armed and security forces. This prerequisite is core for 
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guaranteeing security and stability. Accordingly, it is fundamental for assuring peace on 
a macro level, and for sustaining the decision making mechanisms that govern the day-
to-day concerns of citizens on a micro level. 
Fourth is the ability to position the state in world order, attain diplomatic recognition and 
ensure independence. This prerequisite is major for preserving the state’s sovereignty.     
Nevertheless, a major point that needs to be addressed is the major objective of a political 
system, mainly in a mosaic society, which is to regulate the relationship between the 
different communities that live within the boundaries of the state. The political system 
thus aims to achieve peaceful coexistence between the factions and provide them with 
legitimate channels to manage their differences according to a well-defined formula. 
 
3.1.1. THE CONSOCIATIONAL FORMULA 
Consociationalism is a system where the main objective is to contain complex and plural 
societies. As Ronald Rogowsky states, it is designed to cope with conflict witnessed 
among people “who are bound by corporate identities which are not necessarily congruent 
with the legally defined body politic of the state. Moreover, such corporate identities are 
often colored by historical memories of persecution or revanchism as well as deep 
prejudice against the neighboring communities - ethnic, religious, tribal, or racial”61.   
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Consociationalism is “non-territorial where constituent units share power that is 
concentrated in a common overarching government”62 . Although this regime entails 
national reconciliation, it however requires a prerequisite to deliver on its role, which is, 
the willingness of all camps to compromise and concede to the balance of power agreed 
upon 63 . Based on “compound majoritarian rather than simple majoritarian” 64 , it is 
characterized by four features: First, the Segmental Autonomy which grants each leader 
of a segment enough authority to rule over his respective faction autonomously, and 
influence the decision-making process. This also means that opposition also participates 
in the government. Second, Grand Coalition is when Leaders of the diversified strata in 
the deeply divided society are given the means to mutually rule the state.   Third is 
Proportionality on which representation, appointments in key positions and, distribution 
of resource are based.  Fourth is Minority Veto, which guarantees, as its nomenclature 
designates, a veto power of participation and influence for minorities in crucial matters, 
thus preventing any attempts of hegemony by majorities”65. 
Consequently, a functional consociational regime requires first that leaders acquire 
capabilities to rule over their segment which necessitates a strict hierarchy within each 
segment, and second, leaders ought to reach agreement on macro and micro issues. 
Henceforth, consociationalism is manifested in two types of politics: one where power is 
condensed at the upper levels, and guaranteed by a strict hierarchy; and the other is rather 
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an organic model where power is concentrated at the center but also includes decision 
makers which are representatives of peripheral bodies.     
 On the other hand, Lijphart recommends six conditions for consociationalism to deliver 
on its objectives:  
• “Distinct lines of cleavage 
• Multiple balance of power 
• Popular attitudes favorable toward a grand coalition 
• External threat 
• Moderate nationalism 
• Relatively low total load on system”66. 
 
3.1.2. CENTRALIZATION 
Defined as “the concentration of political power or government authority at the national 
level rather than peripheral level”67.  Acentralized system holds responsibilities that touch 
macro as well as micro issues. Decisions regarding issues ranging from political, 
economic, social welfare to diplomatic affairs and international positioning are all taken 
by a narrow segment of representatives. It therefore does not necessarily meet the 
diversified needs of peripheral districts, especially in mosaic societies.    
The major objectives behind the adoption of a centralized system in a state are: 
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First is National Unity, where it is considered that a centralized government has the 
capabilities to guarantee common interest, whereas a weak and dispersed authority could 
lead to disintegration.  
Second is Uniformity, which means that a strong center can draft uniform laws and thus 
fair and equitable ones. These laws allow for a dynamic rather than a static socio-political 
behavior as it transcends geographic borders between different regions.  
Third is Equality, insinuates that only a central government can allow for equality of 
resources because it does not restrict a district or areas which are poor in resources to 
access other areas assets. 
Fourth and last is Prosperity which means that a central government is capable of 
preserving the national currency value, design fiscal strategy which benefits the state as 
a whole, and guarantee sustainable development and advancement”68.    
The following section analyzes the main features of the Lebanese political system.  
 
 
3.2. THE LEBANESE POLITICAL SYSTEM 
Lebanon’s political system is built upon three main pillars: The constitution of 1926, the 
National Pact of 1943, the Taif Accord of 1990. These pillars divide the history of “the 
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formation of modern Lebanon”69into four main periods: before 1926; 1926 to 1943; 1943 
to 1990; 1990 to-date.   
Situated in the dynamic area of the Middle East, Lebanon has been subject to 
administrative and geographical changes.  However, its plural aspect has always been 
recognized by the ruling system, namely, its Christian majority that distinguished it from 
its surrounding Muslim neighborhood. Tracing briefly the history of power-sharing 
formulas in Lebanon, one should stop at the management of the government of Mount 
Lebanon (1860-1920) under Ottoman rule. After the failure of Kaymakamate and the 
massacres of Deyr-El-Qamar in 1860 by the Druze that led Christians to flee70, the Mont 
Lebanon divided between the Northern Christian Kaymakamate and the Southern Druze 
Kaymakamate lost some of its administrative autonomy to the Ottoman Khurshid Pasha. 
After major violations of Christian’s rights in Lebanon, Syria and Palestine, a coalition 
of Britain, France, Russia, Austria and Prussia established a committee under the 
presidency of Khurdish Pasha for the “reorganization of Lebanon”71. In 1861, the new 
Lebanese statute known as the Reglement Organique established the autonomous 
Lebanese Mutasarrifate.  
Although France was among the sponsors of the Reglement Organique, however, they 
aspired for additional independence for Maronite by thus nurturing the ideology of 
Christian Nationalism. Additionally, Maronite resentment towards the non-Lebanese 
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Mutassarif and the reduced territory of Lebanon was growing72.   The Druze however 
embraced their position as a minority and aspired for a tighter bond with the Ottoman 
Mutasarrif. France was considered to be the “kind mother”73  of Christians, and after it 
ousted the Ottoman Empire took tutelage over Lebanon in 1918 - thus it answered 
Maronite aspirations and extended the Lebanese Territory. On September 1, 1920, the 
State of Greater Lebanon was declared, now including Beirut, the Bikaa, Saida, Tyre, 
Tripoli, and Akkar. In 1926, its constitution was approved and the state of Greater 
Lebanon became the Lebanese Republic, and from 26 May 1926 the first President of the 
Republic took office - Greek Orthodox Charles Dabbas 74 . As per the constitution, 
Lebanon is a Republic, with a parliamentary system where the President of the Republic 
should swear loyalty to the Lebanese Nation and the Lebanese territory defined by the 
current boundaries unalterable. Although Maronite rejoiced the enlargement of the 
Lebanese territory, however, the annexed areas - which were predominantly Muslims - 
witnessed waves of agitation as locals felt they belonged to Muslim Syria rather than 
Christian Lebanon. In 1936, the “Conference of the Coast”, brought together prominent 
Muslim figures who called for the detachment of the annexed areas from Lebanon and 
their reintegration in Syria 75 .  This is the era when parties or movements such as 
separatists the Syrian National Party (1932), Christian Nationalist Kataeb Party (1936), 
and Muslim Scout Najjada (1937) were established76.   
                                                 
72Ibid, P.118 
 
73Ibid, P.119 
 
74Ibid,. P.167 
75Ibid, P.180 
 
76Ibid, P.181 
41 
 
In 1939, the Franco-Lebanese treaty which was passed unanimously by the Lebanese 
Chamber obtaining Christian and Muslim representatives’ approval, brought changes to 
the status of the Lebanese State. It stated that Lebanon shall be considered Independent 
and Sovereign, and a potential League of Nations member. However, it would still 
provide France with military services.  
This remained in force until 21 November 1941, when as a result of combined Christian-
Muslim resilience, and Muslim recognition of an Arab yet independent Lebanon, led to 
the French declaring Lebanon an Independent State. This paved the way towards a new 
era in Lebanon’s history. 
In 1945, President Bechara El-Khouri and PremierRiad El-Solh put forth the National 
Pact, a “gentleman’s agreement” between Christians and Muslims which aimed at 
determining Lebanon’s identity and position within the larger regional and international 
system. The Pact set the parameters of collaboration between the religious factions. 
Although Lebanese had found a Christian-Muslim co-operation formula through the 
National Pact, however, it did not prevent the eruption of a fifteen years’ bloody civil 
war, which divided the Lebanese from 1975 to 1990 along sectarian lines.  
In 1990, the Taif Accord or the National Reconciliation Accord sponsored by the USA, 
KSA, and Syria, ratified by the Lebanese government on 5 November 1989, aimed mainly 
at re-establishing peace and maintaining the diversity that characterizes Lebanon through 
balancing the power among sects and preserving their rights. It marked the end of the 
civil war and re-institutionalized consociationalism and centralization. It reformed the 
power sharing formula in response to Muslim demands. Although it aimed at constructing 
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a national identity, however it determined in its preamble that Lebanon is Arab in its 
identity. Referring to the draft of the Taif Accord published on the United Nations official 
website77, acknowledging the Lebanese system aims at: 
First, establishing legitimacy, in reference to point (d) of the preamble, which states that 
“the people are the source of authority”. 
Second, founding national principals and identity and consequently preserving human 
rights liberties, with reference to the preamble’s point (c)78 which tackles clearly matters 
of equality; and the preamble’s point (g) which tackles socio-economic welfare, freedom 
of expression life (Part A, Chapter 1, Article 13),  as well as participation in public life 
(Part A, Chapter 1, Article 12).  
Third, guaranteeing security and stability through institution enforcement, discussed in 
depth in Part B, where separation of power is sanctified and the role of each of the 
branches is determined. 
Fourth, preserving sovereignty through positioning Lebanon within the larger system as 
mentioned in the preamble part (b). 
The accord called for radical reforms such as the abolition of sectarianism and the 
establishment of a decentralized administrative system, reaffirmed consociationalism and 
centralization.  
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3.2.1. THE LEBANESE CONSOCIATIONAL FORMULA 
The first form of power-sharing between the diverse sectarian factions in Lebanon was 
put forth in the time of the Mutassarifate which excluded Beirut, the Biquaa, Sidon, and 
Tripoli. Governed by an Ottoman Christian Catholic Moutassarif, himself appointed by 
the Ottoman Porte, the Moutassarrif was to be assisted by a council of twelve elected 
members representing the sectarian diversity of the Mutassarifate: “One Shiite, One 
Suuni, One Greek Catholic, Two Greek Orthodox, Three Druze, and Four Maronites”79.  
Under the French Mandate, the State of Greater Lebanon was governed by French 
governors who were assisted by an Advisory Committee of seventeen nominated 
sectarian representatives, and a Representative Council whose members were elected 
along sectarian lines. The Representative Council, which became the Chamber of 
Deputies in 1926 under the new constitution, was to elect a president of the Republic, 
Greek Orthodox Charles Debbas80.   
Quoting Michel Chiha, a main contributor in the drafting of the constitution, “Lebanon is 
a country which tradition must defend against force”81 . Consequently, the constitution 
did not clearly specify the dynamics of collaboration between the diverse sectarian 
communities. The text laid down the foundation for equitable representation of the 
various strata of the Lebanese society; however, it did not specify ratios nor assigned 
specific governmental positions to specific sects.  During Orthodox Debbas presidential 
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term which extended until 1929, several Maronites were appointed to head the Lebanese 
Cabinet. As for the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, they were headed by Sunni 
Muhamad Al-Jisr, who was condemned by Muslim counterparts for his participation in 
the Government. Afterward, in 1937, the appointment of Sunni Khayr Al-Din Al-Ahdab 
as Prime Minister set the foundation of a general belief that Presidents shall be Maronites 
and Premiers shall be Sunnis. Later, under President’s Edde, the Franco-Lebanese treaty 
which was signed in 1939, introduced the “6-6 bis”82 an essential element which was 
considered to be a guarantee of fair representation of all sects.  
The post-independence new era brought with it new power-sharing formulas. In 1943, a 
Chamber of Deputies of fifty-five seats, thirty of which assigned to Christians, and 
twenty-five to Muslim and Druze83, was designed before the 1943 elections. This is when 
the precedence 6:5 ratio was set, and was abided by until 1990. The elected Chamber 
voted for Bechara El-Khouri to head the state, who appointed Riad El-Solh as Premier 
and called him to form a government representing the six major sects in Lebanon.  With 
the end of the French mandate on November 22, 1943, Khouri and Solh founded the basis 
of co-operation between Christians and Muslims in what is known as the National Pact, 
“a gentleman’s agreement” including the points below: 
a. Foreign Policy: Christians shall not seek foreign intervention, and recognize 
Lebanon as an Arab-affiliated state. Muslims shall leave behind their ambition to 
annex Lebanon to Syria. 
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b. Power-sharing: 
▪ The President of the Republic is Christian Maronite. 
▪ The Prime Minister is Sunni Muslim. 
▪ The Speaker of the Parliament is Shi'a Muslim. 
▪ The Deputy Speaker of the Parliament and the Deputy Prime Minister are 
Christian Greek Orthodox. 
▪ Parliament members are always in a ratio of six Christians to five 
Muslims84 
 
As this pact is an agreement between the confessions, it consequently involved a so-called 
sectarian consideration as it ensures the agreement on power-sharing centers in 
departments and public institutions between the communities based on sectarian criteria. 
It is through this National Pact that the consociational system was firstly introduced to 
Lebanon. Nevertheless, since this Pact was not featured in any constitutional 
amendments, therefore, it was misinterpreted by parties, each according to its own 
interests and hence, palpably created intractable religious tensions within the population. 
Similarly to the National Pact, the recent consociational formula has been 
institutionalized in the Lebanese political system with the aim to guarantee stability, 
neutralization, and fair representation among Lebanon’s two major communities, 
Christians and Muslims. It also aimed to reconcile the concerns of different sects in order 
to build trust among them and henceforth, prevent conflict, achieve peace and enforce 
coexistence. The Taif Accord, the revised consociational formula and the “pacted 
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democracy”85 based on which the National Pact, attempted to achieve inter-communal 
equilibrium by embracing a consensual sectarian logic”86. The Accord is divided into two 
sections. The first, which constitutes three quarters of the document, deals with internal 
reforms. It determines procedures for restructuring the power balance, reallocating 
governmental positions, and granting the veto power to all sectarian factions. The second 
is devoted to external relations relevant to the Arab-Palestinian-Israeli conflict and to 
Lebanese-Syrian relations.  
What are the main features of the Lebanese consociational formula which were reformed 
by the Taif Accord? 
Firstly, it established a Chamber of Deputies of one hundred and eight seats divided 
equally between Christians and Muslims87. In 1992, the number of seats in the parliament 
was increased to one hundred and twenty eight, sixty four Christians, and sixty four 
Muslims88. Pertaining to proportionality; The Taif Accord distributed key positions based 
on a 50:50 ratio. Article 95 of the constitution states “As a transitory measure and for the 
sake of even justice and concord, the communities shall be equally represented in public 
posts and in ministerial composition, without damage to State interest resulting there 
from”. Parity in representation preserved a balance between sects and attempted to 
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prevent either the army or any one religious or political group to exercise hegemony over 
others89.   
Secondly, pertaining to segmental autonomy; the Lebanese constitution enshrines the 
concept in Article 9 “Liberty of conscience is absolute. By rendering homage to the 
Almighty, the State respects all creeds and guarantees and protects their free exercise, 
on condition that they do not interfere with public order. It also guarantees to individuals, 
whatever their religious allegiance, the respect of their personal status and their religious 
interests”, and Article 10, “ Education is free so long as it is not contrary to public order 
and to good manners and does not touch the dignity of creeds. No derogation shall affect 
the right of communities to have their schools, subject to the general prescriptions on 
public education set by the State”90. 
Thirdly, pertaining to minority veto, and aiming at preserving the “covenant of mutual 
existence” a veto power is granted to each of the sectarian factions. Mutual sectarian veto 
is used in major national or foreign affairs decisions91. 
Fourthly, pertaining to grand coalition, this characteristic is clearly missing92. Lebanon’s 
consociational formula has however been characterized by main divergence from the 
initially recognized consociational model. Although leaders are granted by constitution 
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means to rule the state mutually, however, these means seem to be dysfunctional in 
practice. The veto power granted by the consociational system to the ruling elite, and their 
consent being at the core of the decision-making process functionality, allowed for 
recurrent deadlocks, in light of elites constant disagreement. Sectarian leaders had not 
healed past wounds caused by the civil war, nor had they re-established trust among them. 
The veto power, which is supposed to be used constructively, is thus used to secure 
communal interest rather than national interest. Elite employ it as a means through which 
they can block any decision that might threaten their respective communities’ wellbeing.  
The Taif consociational formula has also weakened the President who still ought to be 
Maronite. The President is unable to legislate without the Premiers consent, and is thus 
“subject to a Sunni Veto”93. The President is granted the power of delay of fifteen days, 
which dispossesses him from any influence over cabinet decisions. It favored the Sunni 
Prime Minister, which gave the cabinet the legitimate authority to exercise the 
responsibilities which has been previously assigned to the president. In the cabinet, 
decisions regarding “fundamental questions such as declaration of war, international 
agreements, electoral laws, citizenship, and administrative decentralization law” 94 , 
required, in practice, a two-third majority quorum for decision approvals. Shiite 
speakership also got reinforced by extending the mandate of the speaker to four 
consecutive years, which included in its scope a major influence on the President’s 
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election, cabinet formation and activity, and responsiveness to Ministerial Bills. 
Decisions in the Parliament require a majority vote95. With the new power balance, a 
consensus among the major three posts was a requirement for any decision. The three 
officials are the sponsors of their respective communities and guardians of their 
interests96. The “Troika” allowed for off-institutional settlements97 and compromise on 
national interest in favor of sectarian interest. However, it resulted in a confusion of 
powers, and consequently to deadlocks regarding complex issues98.  
Furthermore, the Lebanese model is a “hybrid model since the electoral system is 
centripetal or incentive-based: multi-member constituencies and reserved seats but 
common and not communal electoral rolls”99. The Taif Accord called for elections on the 
basis of Muhafaza’s which are six in Lebanon; North Lebanon, Beirut, Mount Lebanon, 
Beqaa Valley, Nabatiyah, and South Lebanon. Elections are based on proportional 
representation with a preferential vote100. However, each election held after the Taif 
Accord was based on a newly designed electoral law. Electoral laws were designed to 
keep the ruling class in power and to suppress any possibility of resistance or change.  
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On another note, The Taif Accord called for the re-establishment of the Senate where all 
sectarian families will be represented and will be responsible for dealing with crucial 
issues. However, 25 years after the signing of the contract, the Senate has not been formed 
yet. In 2008, the Doha agreement has brought a new feature to Lebanon’s consociational 
formula. The “guaranteeing third” of the “blocking third” has been introduced in the 
cabinet formula. This feature has not been included in the constitution and it was only 
used under the Saad Hariri mandate, in the cabinet of 2009. 
The main reason why the Lebanese had adopted consociationliasm is to give assurances 
to all communities by giving them the power to veto any decisions that is not in their 
respective favor, which will consequently secure their right, deter their fears, rebuild trust 
among them and help integrate them under the umbrella of the Lebanese state.  
 
3.2.2. THE LEBANESE CENTRALIZED AUTHORITY  
Following the era of the Kaymakamate when Lebanon was divided into two 
administrative units, the Mutassarifate divided Lebanon into seven administrative casas 
each governed by a Kaymakam representing the dominant sect within the district. Each 
district was also divided into villages where local people elected heads of villages. 
Security was maintained by judicial police. As for the budget, it was based on the taxes 
collected within the territory. The Judiciary was formed by a court of first instance and 
appeal. The Ottoman administration was aspiring for an intensified centralization which 
offended Christians who benefited from a degree of self-rule in Christian districts and 
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consequently did not believe the promises of equality between Christians and Muslims in 
an Empire with a majority of Muslims101. 
After Maronite aspirations were met and the State of Greater Lebanon was recognized in 
1926, under the administration of French Secretary General Robert De Caix, the Lebanese 
administrative system was founded:-the Lebanese electoral law, real estate law, 
gendarmerie, in addition to the introduction of the Syro-Lebanese pound which issuance 
rights were given to the Banque de Syrie et Du Liban102.  As for governmental institutions, 
the Legislative was to be formed of a Chamber of Deputies which was mandated for four 
years, and a Senate which was mandated for six years. The President was to be elected 
by the two houses in a mutual session, sits in power for three years, renewable.  The 
Lebanese constitution was subject to its first amendment in 1929 when the Senate was 
abolished and the mandate of the President extended to six years, non-renewable. In 1934, 
a Code of Civil Procedures was introduced to the Chamber of Deputies and the judicial 
branch was reformed.   
In Lebanon under French mandate, a highly centralized authority was established to help 
colonial power strengthen their grip over the colonies. Even after its independence, 
Lebanon was still suffering from the previously established patronage system. Former 
Army General Fouad Chehab, who headed the state from 1958 to 1964, was known to 
have tried to strengthen governmental institutions. However, the centralized authority 
which was subject to rooted to a clientelistic system based on sectarian affiliations, proved 
unable to be broken.      
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The Taif Accord has recognized the repercussions of a centralized administrative 
authority and the struggle over power and resources it leads to, within a divided society 
along sectarian lines. In order to deter the corrupt and clientele system it had called for 
the application of an administrative decentralization.  
It aimed at balancing between regions, and serving all the districts irrespective of the 
sectarian demographic/geographic distribution, through introducing new requirements 
for an inclusive economy within a capitalist system103. However, through practices, it 
reinforced a centralized administration. However the formula proposed was ambiguous 
and was not implemented - even today, 25 years after the ratification of the agreement. 
At the bottom of the pyramid is the President of the Municipality who rules over a village 
and is elected by the habitants of that same village. He has the authority the execute 
projects which cost is below three million Lebanese pounds and has a very limited 
authority. The President of the Municipality reports to the Ka’emMakam who is 
appointed by the government and rules over a district. Lebanon is divided into 26 districts. 
The Ka’emMakam reports to the Governor who is also appointed by the government. The 
Governor or Mouhafez, agent of the central authority rules over a province, and there are 
6 provinces (larger entities including combining several districts) in Lebanon. However, 
the Governor’s scope of action is very limited. Enjoying very limited authority, the 
Governor has no jurisdiction over his province. He reports to, and is held liable, by the 
Minister of Interior and Municipalities and shall respond the minister’s requests 
regardless of his area’s needs. Whenever requested by the Minister, the Mouhafez can 
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dissolve the Council of Municipality, control Municipal budget, and influence officials’ 
recruitment104. It is important to note that the appointed Ka’emMakam and Governor are 
never natives of the areas over which they rule, and therefore limits their capabilities to 
address the needs of the habitants. Consequently, all decisions are taken at the center and 
are then imposed unanimously among districts; while ignoring the specific needs of each 
area. Whether it was a macro decision that targets one aspect of the constitutional entity, 
or a micro decision that touches the citizens’ day-to-day lives, distinctiveness of 
geographical areas and sectarian communities are never tackled equitably. Local areas 
are not allowed to manage their own local affairs. 
The above chapter has discussed the main features of Lebanon’s consociational system 
and mainly the veto power granted to conflicting sectarian factions on the one hand, and 
the centralized system which has concentrated the authority and all types of policy and 
decision-making procedures at the central level on the other. 
The following chapter will evaluate the functionality of the consociational formula and 
the centralized administration in light of sectarian divisions and will demonstrate how the 
current Lebanese system is leading to governmental deadlocks and paralysis. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE OUTCOME OF THE LEBANESE FORMULA: 
DEADLOCKS, FREEDOMS VIOLATIONS,  
UNENFORCED RULE OF LAW, AND FOREIGN 
INTERVENTIONS 
 
The following chapter will evaluate the functionality of the consociational formula and 
the centralized administration in light of sectarian divisions. It will demonstrate that, 
despite the fact that the sectarian facet of the Lebanese society has been recognized by 
this system, and despite the system itself being designed with the objective of achieving 
peaceful coexistance and prosperity, it has, however, fallen short from achieving its 
objectives. The ultimate benchmark of any constitutional structure is “to enforce rule of 
law, to provide rights and freedoms to communities as well as to individuals, to maintain 
security domestically, and, to protect the country’s sovereignty”105. However, as it will 
be demonstrated hereafter, the Lebanese political system could not deter recurrent 
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governmental deadlocks and paralysis. Henceforth, its dysfunctionality has led to its 
failure to enforce rule of law, or provide basic human rights and freedoms. 
It will then be verified that the failure of the State to deliver on its role has intensified 
inter-sectarian conflicts, and foreign interventions were needed to hinder violent clashes, 
making Lebanon a permeable country whose sovereignty is continuously violated. 
 
 
4.1. GOVERNMENTAL DEADLOCKS 
The consociational formula and the centralized authority in light of primordial 
sectarianism, have led to governmental deadlocks in decision making. Whether pertaining 
to macro issues such as national security and foreign affairs, or micro issues such as the 
economy and social welfare, Lebanese statesmen have proven unable to achieve consent. 
This situation rendered the system dysfunctional. 
The political system aimed at creating a more balanced relationship among the state's 
three highest officials- the President (Maronite), Prime Minister (Sunni), and Speaker of 
Parliament (Shiite) along with the introduction of equitable representation for Christians 
and Muslims in Parliament106 .However, it hindered the functionality of the decision 
making process.  
The weakening of the President is clearly stated in the Taif Accord in Articles 55 (3) 
which considers under precise circumstances a Presidential Decree to dissolve the 
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Chamber as null, or Article 56 (2) which grants the President a period of fifteen days to 
review a decision and even if he refuses it, it is the Council of Ministers call to promulgate 
it.  Article 57107 imposes on the President consultation with the Council of Ministers on 
laws, which are considered operational whenever a time limit is exceeded, even without 
the approval of the President.  
Initially, the reformed political system strengthened the role of the Council of Ministers 
as a stand-alone institution. The Council of Ministers operates under a two-third quorum, 
where decisions are taken by "consensus", and made by a majority plus one voting 
whenever an impossibility of agreement presents itself. Although the constitution 
explicitly mandates that the “core subjects” need to be approved by a vote of two thirds 
of the members of the Government, with a clear specification of the content of the “core 
themes”, only rarely the Government resorted to a vote. It rather sought consensus to 
resolve the dispute. Hence, if the parties reach an agreement on a matter, no clear problem 
is identified, but if parties do not agree, the country witnesses a crisis of governance. 
Lijphart claims, “decision making that entails accommodation among all subcultures is a 
difficult process, and consociational democracies are always threatened by a degree of 
immobilism”108.  Hence the recurrent deadlock in decisions pertaining to macro and micro 
issues are discussed further in this chapter. 
Regarding centralized administration, the impotence of the Government itself, and its 
failure to address the needs of peripheral communities, prompted sectarian leaders to take 
the lead, organize themselves, and operate in favor of their own interests. Consequently, 
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and as Edward Shils assumes “there cannot be a government with a real authority because 
the political leaders are too much concerned or drawn in the interests of particular groups 
of individuals”109. Additionally, and as Malcolm Kerr claims: "Governments are not 
made to create public policy, nor to choose between clear-cut alternatives entailing the 
triumph of one set of demands over another, but to reflect faithfully and adjust the 
competing interests of various groups"110. 
The political system mandated by the Taif Agreement is, in itself, a direct cause behind 
the recurrent crises which plunged Lebanon into the turmoil and kept the “solutions” 
depending on the system’s contradictions111. Hence, these political reforms proposed by 
the Taif Agreement revealed a contradiction between the primordial sectarian affiliations, 
that proved to be a given in the Lebanese formula, and the construction of a secular, 
national identity. The Agreement resulted in a reproduction of the Lebanese confessional 
state under a new formula. 
Governmental deadlocks are translated into two categories of deadlocks: the first is the 
paralysis in decision-making pertaining to political issues, and the second is the paralysis 
in decision-making pertaining to socio-economic or day-to-day issues. 
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4.1.1 POLITICAL PARALYSIS CAUSED BY CONSOCIATIONALISM  
 
The first political deadlock discussed is that of the Presidential elections of 2008, when 
President Michel Sleiman was only elected after a dialogue was held in Doha under the 
patronage of Qatar. The same case was witnessed again in 2014 at the end of the President 
Sleiman’s mandate, where the Lebanese schisms and involvement in regional crisis has 
led to the Presidential vacancy. Currently, we can count almost two years of Presidential 
vacuum. Instead of abiding by the constitution by electing a President, and keeping 
negotiations under the umbrella of Government, political parties launched bilateral 
discussions aiming at facilitating the Government’s operations in light of a vacant 
Presidential position. The Free Patriotic Movement headed my Michel Aoun and the 
Lebanese Forces headed by Samir Geagea, known rival Christian camps aimed through 
their dialogue at facilitating the Presidential elections, enforcing and activating state’s 
institutions, and enhancing their collaboration between the two camps112. On another 
note, head of future movement Saad Hariri initiated a dialogue with head of Marada 
Movement, Sleiman Frangieh, and although both movements are rivals, the former part 
of the March 14 coalition and the latter part of the 8 March coalition, Hariri suggested the 
election of Frangieh as a convenient option that would help resolve the Presidential 
dilemma 113 . Although these dialogues look like a light of hope, however, the 
consociational system that provides the Veto power to different sectarian factions, and 
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113Annahar, 15/12/2015, http://www.annahar.com/article/293701-ىلا-ىتم-رمتسي-يريرحلا-يف-حيشرت-هيجنرف 
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requires a consensus among them in decision-making, seems not to provide proper 
legitimate channels to end the presidential vacuum.  
 
The second political deadlock discussed is one that reached the design of the 
Parliamentary electoral law. President Michel Sleiman issued a decree calling for 
Parliamentary elections in June 2014, but political parties were unable to agree on an 
electoral law. And thus, the Parliament extended its mandate twice and currently operates 
illegitimately. With the Future Movement and the Progressive Socialist Party who oppose 
the adoption of the law based on proportional representation114, highly supported by 
Hezbollah and Amal movement, on the one hand, and the Christians who call for the 
design of an equitable law that guarantees Christian representation on the other, the 
consensus over the matter seems hard to reach.    
Additionally, and also relating to the electoral law, Eligible electoral age has always been 
an issue of conflict between sects. The Christians do not approve lowering the voting age 
to 18 because will increase the number of Muslim voters and out weight the number of 
Christian voters: "the overall change is that the proportion of Muslim voters rises from 
60% to 61% while the proportion of Christian voters falls from 40% to 39%". Lowering 
the voting age would require a change in the constitution, meaning two-thirds of both the 
Cabinet and Parliament. Amal Movement, Hezbollah and the Progressive Socialist Party 
support this change, the Free Patriotic Movement is against it, the Future Movement has 
not stated a clear decision, while the Kataeb Party and the Lebanese Forces only accept 
                                                 
114L’orient Le Jour, 3/12/2015, http://www.lorientlejour.com/article/958343/au-coeur-des-enjeux-la-
nouvelle-loi-electorale.html 
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if they let the Lebanese citizens abroad vote too115. This suggestion was put forth because 
the Lebanese Diaspora, which has a Christian majority, will balance the disequilibrium 
which will be caused with the lowering of the electoral age. 
 
The third political deadlock resulting from the failure of consensual consociationalism, 
has impacted the appointments and dismissal of first-class Government staff. Whenever 
the agreement over appointments is impossible to reach, the council of Ministers would 
refrain from appointing, which will result in vacuum and prevent the institutions to fulfill 
its managerial and regulatory roles. A crucial position is the appointment of the Army 
General. Due to the consociational formula, paired with sectarian affiliations and a 
vertical political division among Lebanese political actors, no agreement on the 
appointment of the Army General has been reached. The consecutive sessions of the 
National Dialogue have once again proved the failure of the parties to tackle the military 
appointments. With the Free Patriotic Movement representatives disagreeing on 
discussing the matter after their incapability to reach an agreement with other Lebanese 
faction on the promotion of General Chamel Roukoz116 , they threatened boycotting 
ministerial and dialogue meetings, thus aggravating the paralysis which surely would not 
have taken place if the political system had been a consociational democracy, granting 
each party a veto power. 
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The deadlock has not only impacted macro political issues, but it has also reached micro 
issues which affects citizens’ day-to-day lives as discussed below, thus aggravating the 
paralysis that contaminated all socio-economic levels on the Lebanese scene.   
 
4.1.2. SOCIO-ECONOMIC PARALYSIS CAUSED BY CONSOCIATIONALISM 
Starting with the major issue that became Lebanon’s trademark in 2015, and also seems 
to mark 2016 due to the inability of the Lebanese leaders to reach consent over a solution, 
is the garbage crisis.  In July 2015, the contract of the Lebanese state with the privately-
owned Sukleen, company, which was contracted to assemble garbage in Lebanon for 
more than a decade, was terminated due to speculations of corruption, and the Lebanese 
state drowned in tons of waste. Consecutive extraordinary meetings were held bringing 
together political leaders in an attempt to find the proper solution. Once again, the Council 
of Ministers took the decision to cancel tenders due to their exorbitant prices and the 
possible relation of companies with several political leaders117. Previously, Lebanon’s 
waste was land-filled in Nehmme, where at least 10,000 habitants live in the vicinity of 
the landfill 118 : a condition that breaches all health international standards, which 
instigated the habitants to protest for having to suffer alone on behalf of all Lebanese. 
With growing sectarian tensions, solutions like the creation of landfills for each sect 
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118Middle East eye, 11/8/2015,  http://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/reportages/la-crise-des-d-chets-du-liban-
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where witnessed, thus aggravating any possibility of consent over the solution to the 
crisis. 
 
A second good example on how sectarian affiliations contribute to the paralysis in a 
consociational and centralized system is the case of Electricité du Liban (EDL), the public 
establishment that supplies Lebanon with electricity, where conflict arose between 
political allies because of sectarian attachment. After the Taif Accord was signed, several 
Shiite Ministers held the portfolio of the Ministry of Energy and Water. As the clientele 
system operates in a sectarian state like Lebanon, Shiite 
Ministers appointed huge numbers of Shiite maintenance workers (نيموايم) on a 
contractual daily basis. In 2013, Gebran Bassil was appointed as the minister of Energy 
and Water. Bassil is a member of Free Patriotic Movement FPM, the Christian movement 
that is the main ally of the Shiites.  In an attempt to reinstate the electricity institution 
where corruption was at its utmost costing Lebanon huge debts, Bassil conducted a study 
that revealed that the number of contractual workers exceeded the demand, that their 
hiring was not based on merit, and thus they are a burden on the institution without adding 
any apparent benefit to the EDL. Minister Bassil decided then to delimit their numbers 
by holding merit exams and studying the market to identify the needed number of 
maintenance contractual workers. The study prompted the need to fire a considerable 
number of employees who happened to be from the Shiite community. Huge protest 
invaded and echoed all over Beirut and the EDL headquarters claiming that this incident 
was nothing but a scheme played by the Christians an attempt to marginalize the Shiites. 
Although the matter was one of reform - alleviating corruption and enhancing 
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performance - the final decision resulted in an inter-sectarian clash between the Christian 
Free Patriotic Movement FPM and the Shiite Amal Movement that are allies of the 8 
March coalition, a political coalition that is so called "trans-sectarian". 
 
The third example is another economic issue, which was handled as being a matter of 
sectarian prevalence, is the Beirut Port fourth basin. A consensus over Beirut Port's 
Authority decision to fill the facilities of the fourth basin of the port was never reached. 
Truckers and port workers who happened to be of a Christian majority refused the filling 
plan, claiming that it is illegal and will cause port workers to lose their jobs. They reverted 
to Christian Ministers who also objected the project.  Maronite Patriarch Beshara Raii, 
and Christian parties such as the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), the Lebanese Forces, 
the Marada and the Kataeb party have also sided with the workers against the project119.  
As for Sunni Prime Minister Tamam Salam, he contacted the Director General of the Port 
and demanded the discontinuity of the project until the cabinet reaches its final decision. 
This is one additional case where an issue of economy and welfare results in sectarian 
clashes120. 
The Fourth concern is that of the Lebanese University LU. The LU conflict is yet another 
prime example. In an article entitled “Lebanon’s only public university latest victim of 
the sectarian system” 121  published on July 11, 2014 in Al-Akhbar, a pro 
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120 The Daily Star, 19/2/2015, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Business/Local/2015/Feb-19/287931-salam-
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Hezbollah newspaper, Hussein Mahdi, showed that even academic institutions, mainly 
the one and only public academic institution, the Lebanese University LU, are subject to 
the harmful effect of sectarianism. Driven by their respective sectarian and political 
interests, ministers were not able to agree and approve full-time Professors’ contracts or 
to appoint Deans to the Lebanese University Council. Moreover, they were indifferent to 
contract Professors open strike with 72,000 students’ exam results and pending futures, 
which threaten to shut down the university: The Christian Kataeb Party wants to appoint 
two Deans, and the party with the Christian Free Patriotic Movement, believes that the 
Druze Progressive Socialist Party PSP has no right to choose the Dean of the Faculty of 
Medicine since it is directly linked to the sectarian quota of the Christians.   
Another sectarian issue, relating to the Lebanese University LU third branch in Tripoli, 
was the appointment of a Christian Director at a faculty of Business and Economics, an 
event that gave rise to protest movements by Sunni students in the city requesting the 
replacement of the Christian Directorwith a Sunni one, taking into account that the two 
other branches are directed by a Shiite and a Christian. Bou Saab, the minister of 
Education and Higher Education in Lebanon said that the problem relates more to the 
feeling of marginalization of a certain group. He declared that the appointments should 
consider the merit and sect of the candidate and should be done in adherence to the 
1943 National Pact that divides power between Muslims and Christians. Ministers’ 
failure to resolve those issues leads us to conclude that sectarian and political interests 
overrule the interests in preserving the University’s academic standards. The Shiite 
president of LU requested neutralizing the University from politicization. He was accused 
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of ignoring the norm of maintaining an equal number of Sunni and Shiite Directors and 
of neglecting to discuss the engagement of Sunni Directors with Sunni parties. 
 
 
4.1.3. GOVERNANCE DEFECTS CAUSED BY CENTRALIZATION 
 
Centralization is aimed primarily at balancing between regions, and serving all the 
districts irrespective of the sectarian demographic/geographic distribution, through 
introducing new requirements for an inclusive economy within a capitalist system122. 
However, through practices, it reinforced a centralized administration. However the 
formula proposed was ambiguous and was not implemented even today, 25 years after 
the ratification of the agreement. 
What are the criteria that characterize Lebanon’s administrative system123; 
First, State Capacity; the centralized administration is one that overburdens the central 
authority and consequently diverts the capacity of the latter to perform its core tasks.  It 
thus prevents peripheral bodies from performing tasks which fall within the needs and 
interest of local areas.  
Second, Organizational Structure; the centralized system is departmentalized and highly 
concentrated whether at the level of the Ministries in Beirut where we witness a lack of 
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123 El-Saad, F, 2001, Strategy for The Reform and Development of the Public Administration in Lebanon. 
Office of the Minister of the State for Administrative reforms. P.3 
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cooperation due to an established ministerial autonomy on the one hand, or at the level of 
the central state where local authorities in region have no authority. 
 
Three, Policy Making; the centralized system is one that conceives unadaptable and 
outdated policies. Lebanon’s political system is highly centralized, concentrated and 
authoritarian; the central Government is the only source of legislation and the large 
majority of offices function within the ministerial boundaries124. Whether related to minor 
day-to-day issues or to issues of a national scale, Ministerial and Parliamentary agencies 
at the highest levels of administrations, design and issue laws, and provinces are forced 
to apply. Consequently, the central authority regulates peripheral areas, which enjoy very 
limited authority. Regardless of provinces specific sectarian and developmental 
conditions, rules issued by the central government are applied unanimously to all regions.  
Four, Civil Services; the centralized administration includes in its body a large number 
of incapable staff whom are not recruited based on merit. With large number of vacant 
positions, recruitments are done with an aim to simply fill in gaps. Citizens find no 
interest in Government jobs where no authority is delegated, and where training and 
development are concentrated at the center, with little attention paid to employees in 
peripheral areas.  
Fifth, Governance; with the central authority having little or no means or channels to meet 
peripheral needs, clientelistic systems have been established between local political 
leaders and partisans. These channels are illegitimate and are not included within the 
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umbrella or written policies and procedures. In 1997, a legislative Decree 118 was issued. 
It called for fiscal autonomy for municipalities which grants them the authority to “adopt 
annual budget, determine taxes and fees, manage municipal funds, control town planning 
and public transport provisions, name streets, develop natural resources, oversee electric 
power projects, maintain and equip fire and rescue services, and draft and regulate laws 
for municipal employees”125.  
Sixth, Accountability; with leaders and partisans having recourse to custom-made 
channels and procedures, and the central authority being far from citizens in peripheral 
areas, corrupt practices have found fertile grounds in the centralized system, and no 
means of accountability have been developed.   
We can conclude that in light of sectarian identities which influence socio-political 
behavior and which drive inter and intra-communal relations as in the case of Lebanon, a 
consociational democracy can lead to attempts of partition, disintegration, violent 
casualties, and in most cases to the dominance of one sectarian faction over the other.  
The veto power granted to sectarian leaders has allowed them to block any decision that 
does not fall within the interest of their community. In addition, having a centralized 
authority where decisions on macro and micro issues are taken, sectarian divisions have 
not only paralyzed the central authority, but it has also affected the daily lives of citizens 
where authorities overseeing their areas have absolutely no power to legislate minor 
socio-economic laws, which at least can allow for sustaining a decent life and provide 
basic needs.   
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The Lebanese formula has not only led to Governmental deadlocks and governance 
deficiencies which in turn has obstructed daily activities, it has also led to the failure of 
the state to enforce rule of law and order on the Lebanese territory. Consequently, each 
sectarian faction has established its own rule of law and order in its area of dominance - 
aswill be discussed hereafter. 
 
4.2. FAILURE TO ENFORCE RULE OF LAW 
A state is an established authority that enjoys jurisdiction over a core territory and people, 
for an extended period of time, stretching over at least several generations. The 
jurisdiction includes power to implement the law, impose taxation, and demand military 
service, loyalty and allegiance to the established authority126.   
This section will demonstrate that the Lebanese state is not capable of enforcing Rule of 
Law, by exposing instances that prove how sectarian non-state actors have acquired de-
facto capabilities to impose their own Rule of Law in their areas of geographic 
dominance, and therefore challenge the legitimate constitutional entity. 
This chapter adopts Brian Tamanaha’s notion of the Rule of Law as: 
“ A principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, 
public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that 
are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently 
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adjudicated, and which are consistent with international Human Rights 
norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence 
to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, 
accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation 
of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of 
arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency."127 
For example, in May 7 2008128, violent clashes erupted in the Lebanese capital Beirut, 
for what basically seemed to be the issue of Hezbollah's private telecom network. 
Hezbollah, with no authorization from any Lebanese legitimate institutions, launched a 
field work in his areas of dominance and have established its private telecom 
infrastructures which the Government cannot supervise. As soon as the other Lebanese 
counterparts raised questions about the matter, casualties exploded preventing any 
attempt of stopping the illegal behavior. What started out as a dispute over what seemed 
a harmless telecom network turned out to have bigger needs related to high security 
promotions and to much more dangerous use for the telecom network. The showdown 
ended leaving the network fully functional given Hezbollah’s autonomous authority 
within its areas129.  
Special Tribunal For Lebanon STL prosecutor Daniel Bellemare accused four Hezbollah 
partisans of the assassination of Hariri. Although their names, photograph and personal 
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information were published, Mustafa Badr al-Din, Hussein Nisi, and Salim Ayyash, and 
Assad Sabra were never arrested.  Regardless of the Lebanese commitment to arrest the 
suspects, detain and transfer them to the Tribunal pursuant to resolution 1757 adopted by 
the Security Council of the United Nations, General Attorney of the Lebanese Court for 
Discrimination reported that none of the accused in the case of an attack February 14, 
2005 were arrested130. Such incidents mirror clear impotence of the Lebanese state to 
challenge the Rule of Law established by Hizbollah in his areas of influence.  
In a TV report131 broadcasted on the Lebanese TV Chanel MTV, shed the light on the 
autonomous rule of law of Shiite residents in the areas of Bekka namely Baalbek and 
Britel. Drug addicts, dealers, and mafia leaders, and fugitives escaping justice, are all 
hiding in an area where the Lebanese state is unable to enter. Autonomous rule of law has 
been established by residents and collaboration with the Lebanese security forces requires 
one non-negotiable prerequisite: “General Amnesty”. 
After a series of bombing targeting Beirut Southern Suburb known to be Hezbollah’s 
area, the party who had acquired legitimacy and authority within his area, established its 
own security force and put in place his security checkpoints on the “Dahiyat” entrances132.  
Armed partisans of Hezbollah are given the responsibility and right to undergo security 
checks on all Lebanese who enter the area.  
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These incidents demonstrate perfectly the deviation from Tamanaha’s definition of Rule 
of Law. Hezbollah’s practices highlight the inequality before the law and the unfairness 
in the application of the law between the different sectarian communities. The Shiites 
community - which was once marginalized - had recourse to illegitimate means in order 
to preserve its rights and attain leverage, and consequently created a state of fear among 
other factions which in turn, resorted to same practices.  
Similarly to the Shiite areas, the state was unable to impose rule of law and order in 
areas dominated by Sunnis. In Saida, which is a Sunni area, the salafi Sunni Sheikh 
Ahmad El Assir, part of the growing Sunni movement in Lebanon and other Arab 
countries, has built for himself an empire in Sidon133. His empire soon mobilized a big 
number of supporters who agreed with the claims of “protecting the Sunnis rights”.  As 
they perceived the Syrian President Bashar El Assaad as their main enemy, breaking 
Hezbollah’s – Assad’s Lebanese ally - hegemonic behavior became a main goal. Al 
Assir did not spare the Lebanese Army either and the main controversial behavior was 
when Al-Assir supporters surrounded an army checkpoint in Abra-Saida and attacked 
them with gunfire134. The incident left many dead among Al-Assir supporters and the 
army. As a reaction, Al-Assir decided to breach public places classification and decided 
to bury his supporters in Saida’s roundabout, thus behaving illegitimately and in full 
autonomy. Al-Assir was hoping to extend his autonomy outside Sidon but his antics 
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were a temporary phenomenon that soon lost its glory. Such incidents also show that the 
state is in incapable of enforcing rule of law. 
Since the beginning of the Syrian Crisis, the border area of Arsale - known for its Sunni 
majority inhabitants - have been making headlines after a series of clashes between 
armed residents and the Lebanese Army. Having established their own rule of law, 
Arsale residents got involved with their neighbors' Syrian counterparts in arm 
smuggling and war, alongside Sunni extremists movements such as the Daech and Al-
Nousra Front. As the Lebanese Army fails to re-establish its authority in Arsale, it has 
been sacrificing martyrs to armed groups in the area135 and is still unable to arrest them.  
Tripoli’s situation is very similar to that of Arsale. Chady Al-Mawlawi and Oussama 
Mansour are two names who made headlines for the past few years. Both involved in 
Salafi groups in the Tripoli area, they were able to mobilize militiamen and launch their 
own military actions in the area136, mainly against the Lebanese Army.  Although 
military Investigative Judge Nabil Wehbe announced he was seeking the death penalty 
for Mawlawi and Mansour for their terrorist actions, yet none of them were arrested. 
Despite their absence, their legacy is still operational and their supporters are still in 
action in Tripoli, their autonomous area of influence.  
Similarly to the failure of the state to impose rule of law and order in Sunnis and Shiites 
areas, and in the absence of the state’s authority, Christians took their fate in hand. 
Threatened of marginalization, local residents of Christian Kfardebian-Mount Lebanon, 
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found themselves in need to impose their own rules. They felt offended by a visit to a ski 
resort by the Salafist Ahmad al-Assir and perceived the visit as a potential threat; they 
blocked the main road to the mountain. Although Al Assir had previously announced that 
he will be visiting the ski resort on the occasion of the prophet's birthday, nevertheless 
around 50 protestors formed "a human barricade" to block the road in a convoy. Despite 
Christian Minister’s calls upon the residents to open the road, such an action was 
considered very normal and anticipated by locals from Kesrwan's who were trying to 
protect the tourism season137. But the question is whether local residents who have no 
legitimate authority, have the right to decide who enters their areas of dominance. 
 
4.3. FAILURE TO PROTECT RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
PROVIDED BY THE CONSTITUTION. 
This section will demonstrate how the Lebanese state is unable to provide its citizens 
and communities with their rights and freedoms guaranteed by the constitution. It will 
describe how each sectarian community acquired means to protect its rights within 
respective areas of demographic dominance and consequently, violate the rights of the 
minority sects in these areas.  
In article 9, the constitution clearly states “There shall be absolute freedom of conscience. 
The state is rendering homage to the Most High shall respect all religions and creeds and 
guarantees, under its protection, the free exercise of all rites provided that the public 
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order is not disturbed. It also guarantees that the personal status and religious interests 
of the population, to whatever religious sects they belong is respected”138, however, its 
application has been far from achieved; in the absence of the state’s authority whose main 
role is to guarantee the protection of the rights and freedoms. 
A case that posed a threat to the basic rights and freedom of expression is the clash 
between the Christian comedy writer and actor Charbel Khalil, and the Shi’i Hezbollah. 
Khalil’s international satirical show "Bas Met El Watan" is known for its sarcastic scripts 
which caricaturizes corrupt practices in Lebanese Politics. After Khalil impersonated in 
his show Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah139, apologizing was not a choice 
for the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC) which airs Khalil’s show for more than 
two decades. Furious supporters of Hezbollah threatened Charbel Khalil and protested 
against his show by burning tires in the streets of the Southern Suburbs of Beirut and 
Baalbeck, areas under Shiite dominance. The issue raised the question on whether there 
are figures in Lebanon which status is above freedom of speech or constructive criticisms 
A similar example of freedom violation is a campaign targeting a series of shops selling 
alcohol in Lebanon's southern cities. Discretely or not, these shops have been burned to 
the ground. As Alcohol consumption is considered as being "haram" or a sin for Islam, 
in regions like Nabatieh, an area with a Shiites dominance, campaigns against liquor 
selling and consumption has been advertised. Many sources from Nabatieh acknowledged 
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that such actions imply more than just alcohol banning140. Non-Muslim residents explain 
it as pressure on those who do not politically agree, or religiously affiliate with the 
pressure group and perceive it as an explicit breaching of individual freedoms. Although 
the municipality communicated the campaign as if it was the result of its own decision141, 
however, in Nabatieh, the area under Hezbollah's de facto jurisdiction, it is clearly the 
party of God's decision. 
Even in the entertainment business we find violation of basic rights, such as the Brazilian 
samba troupe who were banned from performing in Tyre by a group of Lebanese Muslim 
scholars. One of those scholars named Seikh Yassin commented that Tyre is not the right 
place for such a performance because it is a conservative city and its people would not 
accept such acts142. The Brazilian troupe had several performances in different cities. And 
even with a promise from the Ministerial advisor of the Brazilian embassy that the dancers 
will dress appropriately, the performance was declined143. The decision upset a large 
group of open minded Lebanese who blamed Hezbollah, as Sheikh Yassine is one of their 
main supporters. 
Another relevant example is that of the Danish newspaper which was considered to 
have insulted the prophet Muhammed through caricaturizing him wearing a turban with 
a bomb hidden inside. This cartoon - although Danish - caused a quick reaction in 
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Beirut144. Attacks were launched by Sunni extremists targeting the Danish Embassy in 
Achrafiyeh. According to a member of that mob, "if anybody insults the Prophet, he 
will have to take a punishment". After that, the Lebanese Government apologized to the 
Denmark for the behavior in those "angry riots"145. 
A notable incident that breached the freedom of belief is the one that took place in Abra, 
a Christian village within Saida’s district, a district with a main Sunni influence. Christian 
Abra’s mayor Walid Nicolas Al Mchantaf, released a memo requesting the residents of 
Sidon to be "considerate of fasting Muslims and abstain from dining at restaurants and 
cafes during the holy month of Ramadan." Such a memo was criticized by officials who 
accused the municipality of "violating citizen's freedom of belief", and destroying 
Lebanon's diversity instead of protecting it. After realizing the reverse impact of the 
decision, the municipality voided the memo by justifying that it will not breach the 
Lebanese constitution, especially the clauses that recommend the protection of freedom 
of belief146. Such memo would not have been published in the first place had radical Sunni 
residents not pressured the Mayor to do so. This example shows that Sunnis are 
attempting to impose their traditions on non-Sunni citizens who reside in their area.   
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A major event which equates to rights and freedom violations is what happened when 
Sunni Minister of Interior, Nouhad al Mashnouk, made a proposal about removing a 
sculpted slogan in Tripoli’s Al-Nour square. Although Tripoli had always included a 
Christian community, however a sculpture of the word "Allah", followed by "Tripoli, the 
Fortress of Muslims" was implanted in the 1980s by the Islamic unification 
movement147.His proposal was welcomed and was categorized as an attempt to alleviate 
the sectarianism tension that was flooding in Tripoli. Conversely, Sunni extremist MP 
Khaked El-Daher was quick to intervene and to reply by requesting the Christians to 
remove their symbols and statutes from their areas - mainly the statute of Jesus-Christ in 
Jounieh- Mount Lebanon. A number of critics were unleashed on the MP accusing him 
of disrespecting the Christian religion. 
 
 
 
4.4. FAILURE TO PREVENT FOREIGN INTERVENTIONS 
Lebanon’s permeability to foreign interventions is the result of Lebanon’s internal 
divisions, where different sectarian Lebanese constituents seek foreign assistance and 
support in order to acquire an edge of authority over other sectarian communities. 
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Consequently, Lebanon is witnessing continuous insecurity, instability, division and 
above all - a defect of sovereignty. 
As the Lebanese state was unable to impose rule of law and consequently resolve inter-
sectarian conflicts, sectarian communities have allowed for foreign interventions. Foreign 
interventionism in Lebanon can be classified into two broad categories: tactical 
interventionism and strategical interventionism - both aiming at providing leverage for 
one group over the others. Relevant examples are: 
1) The case of Libya’s support for Islamic groups like the Nasserite in the name of 
pan-Arabism 
2) The interventions of France and the United States and their continuous influence in 
domestic Lebanese affairs during President Gemayel’s term, that preserved the 
status quo, in the name of legitimacy 
3) The case of Iran’s support for Shiites in the name of Islam that is still relevant 
today.  
This kind of support offered these groups marginal bargaining benefits over others in 
Lebanon at precise periods148.  
Justified principally by the need for security, the second category of interventions, labeled 
as strategic interventionism, has had destructive consequences on national institutions, 
education and religion. By virtue of their geographical proximity, its actors, Syria, Israel 
and the PLO had always sought long-term influence and control over internal Lebanese 
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political affairs and institutions. In order to exercise control over the Lebanese 
communities, these actors encouraged inter-group and inter-sectarian conflicts and 
rivalries which further hindered internal reconciliation 149 . Accordingly, Lebanon 
witnessed two types of influence: Israel and Syria gained a major role in Lebanon through 
Lebanese proxy alliances on the one hand, and the PLO operated in parallel to Lebanese 
institutions and created their own ghettos where the Lebanese government was unable to 
control, on the other.  
Lebanese internal conflicts have allowed for foreigners to intervene in Lebanese affairs 
and impose agreements which, on the outset promoted peaceful settlements, but ended up 
with favoring one group over the other. 
 
4.4.1. THE CRISIS OF 1958  
Earlier in 1956, under the mandate of the Lebanese Christian President Camil Chamoun, 
tensions with Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser rose as Lebanon kept close 
diplomatic relations with the West, even after it attacked Egypt during the Suez Crisis. 
This tension was further increased when Chamoun adopted the Baghdad Pact, considered 
by Abdel Nasser as a pro-western Pact constituting a threat to Arab nationalism. Egypt 
and Syria created the United Arab Republic (UAR) as a reaction to the Baghdad Pact. In 
July 1958, Lebanon faced a threat of a civil war between Maronites Christians and 
Muslims because the Lebanese Sunni Prime Minister Rashid Karami wanted the 
government to join the United Arab Republic, while President Chamoun wanted to 
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remain associated with the West. Consequently, the UAR supported a Muslim civil 
revolution, which prompted President Chamoun to lodge a complaint to the United 
Nations Security Council. However, inspectors claimed they were not able to find any 
proof of major intervention from the UAR.  On July 15, 1958, Eisenhower, President of 
the United States, authorized the Operation Blue Bat, that marked the first steps of the 
implementation of the Eisenhower Doctrine, under which the U.S. announced that it 
would intervene to protect regimes considered threatened by international communism. 
In the case of Lebanon, the operation had to support the pro-Western Lebanese 
government of President Camil Chamoun against threats from Syria and Egypt, mainly 
by securing Beirut International Airport, and Beirut Port. Consequently, the U.S. Marines 
landed in Lebanon in 1958. President Eisenhower sent his personal representative, the 
American diplomat, Robert D. Murphy, to Lebanon, to convince both domestic 
conflicting sides to compromise and agree to elect moderate Christian Army General 
Fouad Chehab as Lebanese President, succeeding Chamoun. The U.S. withdrew its forces 
from Lebanon on October 25, 1958. 
The USA intervention is an attempt by the Christians to acquire autonomy over other 
sectarian factions in Lebanon through the support of foreign actors. 
 
4.4.2. THE CRISIS OF 1969 
For thirty years, different terms and definitions were attributed to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict: a border conflict, a colonial conflict, an ethnic conflict and a religious struggle. 
It has been seen as a product of Big Powers intervention or a repercussion of World War 
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II150. However, and regardless of its branding, the Arab-Israeli conflict was imported to 
Lebanon due to mistrust among its different sectarian constituencies, where each 
community sought empowerment over others through foreign alliances.  
On November 2 1969, the Chairman of the PLO Yasser Arafat and the Lebanese army 
commander General Emile Boustany reached the Cairo Accord, under the patronage of  
Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. The agreement gave the Palestinian residents of 
Lebanon the right to "join the Palestinian Revolution through armed struggle" and 
allowed them to legally control their refugee camps in Lebanon; in addition to the right 
to attack Israel from south Lebanon.  Moreover, the Cairo Agreement stipulated that the 
16 official United Nations Relief and Works Agency UNRWA camps in Lebanon 
sheltering approximately 300,000 Palestinian refugees, be  placed under the authority of 
the Palestinian Armed Struggle Command instead of being overseen by the Lebanese 
Army's Deuxième Bureau. Consequently, the agreement resulted in allowing the PLO to 
effectively establish a Palestinian State within the Lebanese state.  
This agreement favored the PLO and its local Sunni allies.  
The military developments of the PLO led to the eruption of the 1975 civil war that 
opposed the Christians Lebanese Front supporting the army on the one hand, and the 
leftist Muslim Lebanese National Movemen tsupporting the PLO.  
                                                 
150Azar, E, Jureidini, P, McLaurin R, Protracted Social Conflict; Theory and Practice in the Middle East. 
P.1 
82 
 
Similarly to the previous case, the Cairo Agreement was an attempt of the Sunni’s to gain 
authority through a Sunni demographic expansion, as Palestinians were in majority 
Sunni’s. 
 
4.4.3. THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR 1975-1990 
The Lebanese civil war ended in 1990 as a result of US, KSA, and Syrian interventions.  
The Taif agreement was tied to regional changes and the end of the cold war. 
Furthermore, the international and the national actors were not all fully vested in the 
agreement.   
As discussed at length previously, the Taif Agreement, drafted under the tutelage of the 
USA, the KSA and SAR, was the institutionalization of Sunni authority, which also gave 
additional power to Shiites, and marginalized Christians. The reformed political system 
did not deliver on its objectives: that of re-establishing an equitable balance of power, 
and reconciliation of conflicting parties. It rather replaced the Maronite hegemony by the 
Sunni and Shiite hegemony on the one hand, and contributed later on to the eruption of 
sectarian clashes in May 2008 opposing Sunnis and Shiites on the other. It has thus 
institutionalized the sectarian cleavage. As Ahmad Beydoun states, “the reasons behind 
violence in Lebanon do not lie in previous wars, but in the peace settlements that were 
adopted” 151 , as these settlements included major loopholes that resulted in “the 
reinforcement of sectarian identity, the weakening of the state, the proliferations of 
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alternative power centers, the prevalence of the inert nature of the government and its 
failure to absorb new social forces, and the incapacity of this rigid political organization 
to adapt to a changing demographic environment”152. 
 
4.4.4. THE CRISIS OF 2008 
After 18-months of political deadlock in Lebanon, the Doha Agreement of 2008 came as 
a preventive measure to an eventual civil war. It was agreed upon by rival Lebanese 
political parties on 21 May 2008 in Doha, Qatarafter the initiative of Qatar's Emir Sheikh 
Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani. A national dialogue was initiated in Doha aiming at re-
establishing the Lebanese state’s authority.  
The Agreement led to constitutional amendments and stipulated the following:  
Firstly, the Lebanese Parliament was to elect General Michel Suleiman, Head of the 
Lebanese Army asPresident. The President was agreed after the consent of all parties. 
Such a prerequisite annulled any advantage given to the sole Christian position in the 
Lebanese Troika and victimizes Christians after inter-sectarian conflicts between 
Iran/KSA proxies. 
Secondly, the agreement called for the formation of a National Unity Government, 
granted 8 March, known to be under Hezbollah’s jurisdiction, the veto power through a 
newly designed formula “the blocking third”. This characteristic resulted in a Ministerial 
deadlock after two years when the March 8 coalition, under Iranian assistance, decided 
to break up the government, and form a new one. 
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Thirdly, the agreement gerrymandered Lebanon’s districts for the 2009 Parliamentary 
elections. The division of districts also served external interest and helped pave the way 
toward pre-set results, and was promoted as being an attempt to avoid any intra-sectarian 
clashes. 
The fourth paragraph stressed, mainly after violent clashes in Beirut on the 8th of May, 
the adoption of peaceful political practices. It also called for resuming the Lebanese 
dialogue that later in 2011 issued the Baabda Accord, an Accord that called for the 
Neutralization of Lebanon. Unfortunately, due to external pressure, both Shiite and Sunni 
clans got involved in the Syrian conflict, thus breaching the only pure Lebanese 
Agreement.  
 
The fifth paragraph placed stress on “Lebanese political leaders to immediately abstain 
from resorting to the rhetoric of treason or political or sectarian instigation”. 
Although the agreement got international support in 2008, due to its permeability, 
Lebanon remained subject to regional shake-ups, mainly it was the Syrian crisis that made 
the agreement dysfunctional. 
The Doha Agreement, (mainly the Blocking Third it granted to Shiites) led to the March 
8 Coalition which was an attempt by the Shiites community to take over Lebanese 
domestic and foreign affairs. 
The Lebanese system unable to address the concerns and grievances of all of its 
constituencies, and impotent in the face of the pluralistic and mosaic aspect of the 
Lebanese society, required domestic parties to turn to outside protectors and imposed on 
Lebanon agreements that favored one sect over the other.  
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The following chapter demonstrates that the imbalance caused firstly by the state 
impotence to enforce Rule of Law and protect Human Rights; and secondly by the 
external interventions that reinforced one group of Lebanese over the other have 
resulted in the creation of autonomous militia rule and a foreign policy dilemma. 
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CHAPTER V 
STATES WITHIN THE STATE 
 
The previous chapters have demonstrated that the political system is unable to embrace 
sectarianism, a primordial aspect of the Lebanese society. Consequently, the Lebanese 
state has proven dysfunctional, subject to deadlocks, unable to enforce rule of law and 
protect rights and freedoms of citizens.  
The impotence of the state has thus intensified sectarianism and led to violence, which 
prevented the Lebanese from building transparent and cooperative inter-sectarian 
relationships. With fear and lack of trust prevailing amongst them, quarrels were 
perceived by sectarian factions as opportunities to strengthen their position within the 
Lebanese formula. Accordingly, Lebanon witnessed two recurrent phenomena (which 
will be discussed further in this Thesis):  
Firstly, each sectarian faction managed by internal and external means, to ascertain its 
own security force by establishing sectarian armed militia and welfare institutions within 
geographic areas of their respective demographic predominance.  
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Secondly, having had recourse to foreign assistance, sectarian factions have developed 
their autonomous foreign relations with actors of their same sectarian affiliation thus 
creating a foreign policy dilemma.  
This phenomenon could closely be labeled as the emergence of states within the state. 
 
5.1. FAILURE TO MAINTAIN SECURITY 
This section will highlight the security defect in Lebanon. It will prove how the weakness 
of the state led to the establishment of sectarian armed militia, which aimed at maintaining 
the security of their communities. It will show how these militias acquired a degree of 
authority within their respective areas of demographic dominance, threatened other sects, 
and challenged the Lebanese Army.  
Security is defined as the responsibility of the state, mainly its legitimate army, to guard 
its citizens from any internal and external threat. The term Security embraces on the one 
hand, Military Security153 which entails the capacity of the state to prevent any kind of 
military aggression, whether foreign or domestic. It is the “condition that results from the 
establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability 
from hostile acts or influences”154. On the other hand, it includes Political Security, which 
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implies the security of the social order and the deterrence of threats to sovereignty; and 
by Sovereignty, it is meant the State’s control of the means of coercion.  
A militia is defined as an autonomous armed organized faction aimed at attaining 
Governmental authority and popular foundation155 through challenging the state itself, 
and competing with factions which adopt conflicting views. In the case of Lebanon, it is 
of crucial importance to note that the majority of militia groups were political parties who 
had their autonomous welfare systems, who carried arms, and who gained authority, in a 
precise period of the Lebanese history, over a well-defined geographical area. 
Additionally, the founding parties of this militia were sectarian; mirroring the nature of 
the Lebanese society156 and each sectarian faction has identified itself with one of these 
bodies157.   “Thus, apart from Beirut in which almost all religious groups are represented, 
each party has a regional stronghold”158.   
During the civil war, sectarian militia emerged and replaced the state by taking over its 
role and achieving a degree of autonomy within their areas of influence. Through means 
of coercion and military capacities, these militias were able to establish their own welfare 
systems, tax regulations, and ports or airports. The repercussions of this oppressive 
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clientele system have prevailed even after the disarmament of the militias. The weakness 
of the state led to the establishment of mini-states within the Lebanese state.  
Two decades after the end of the civil war, we can still identify ex-Militia leaders, who 
were re-integrated in the political life, enhancing their elitist role, and aiming at additional 
autonomy within their mini-states which prove once again the strength of the sectarian 
affiliations.  There continues to be popular support of this as a reality.  
As Samir Khalaf states “sectarian sentiments and their associated clientelistic loyalties 
appear to have reaffirmed themselves more than ever before. Military and economic 
reasons have doubtless played a crucial role in the process, as affiliations with militias 
rapidly became the most effective means for ensuring one’s physical security, as well as 
providing vital goods and services”159.  
Sectarian communities in Lebanon were created based on deeply rooted religious 
ideologies. As such, they had to organize themselves not as a need for political 
expression, but rather as a prerequisite to survive. Accordingly, their leaders were the 
channels by which their day-to-day needs and demands were conveyed. That is when 
welfare associations operating under the umbrella of sectarian militia such as the 
Christian Phalange, and Shiite Amal emerged. Although this phenomenon seemed 
peaceful and ordinary, it however challenged the legitimacy of the state and created 
platforms by which these communities operated outside the frame of the government. 
Lack of trust prevailing among Lebanese sectarian communities in light of the 
dysfunctional system that is unable to enforce rule of law, protect rights, and guarantee 
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peaceful inter-sectarian relations, triggered fear, and prompted sects to arm their partisans 
in order to maintain their security. 
 
5.1.1 SUNNI MILITIA 
Sunni militia never formed a single umbrella organization. They have been organized in 
different brigades, widespread in different areas known to have a predominant Sunni 
population such as Tripoli, Arsale, and Sidon.  
Previous to the eruption of the Lebanese civil war in 1975, the motive behind the 
establishment of these armed groups was the Arab identity and the disassociation of 
Sunnis from a Lebanese identity. Sunnis of Lebanon always felt they were part of a larger 
Arab whole. Lebanon entered the tunnel of the Arab-Israeli conflict after a wave of 
Palestinian immigrants who were mainly Sunnis, invaded its soil. Additionally, the 
revolution of Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt in 1952 and the rise of Arab nationalism and 
Arabism created among Sunnis a feeling of political marginalization which was not 
suitable and equitable to their growing demographic number.  Resentment towards the 
ruling class was cemented in the revolution of 1958 against President Chamoun, an event 
during which Lebanon witnessed the first signs of political change by the means of 
illegitimate use of military force. 
The first group to discuss among the Sunni Militia were the Nasserite Activists, 
Mourabitoun, founded in 1957 after the rise of Pan-Arabism with Gamal Abdel Nasser, 
headed by Ibrahim Koulaylat. It mobilized about 2000 militia men against President 
91 
 
Camille Chamoun and the Lebanese army. The Mourabitoun continued their military 
activism and joined the Arab-Leftist front during Civil War. 
The revolution against President Chamoun was followed by the defeat of the Arabs in the 
6-days war in 1967 against Israel, which consequently, led to the displacement of an 
additional number of Palestinians. This defeat created a feeling of discontent among 
Arabs towards the Christian West, accused of supporting Israel against the Arabs and 
Muslims, and gave rise to the first organized militia on the Lebanese territory, the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization - PLO. The PLO was backed by Arab Islamic and 
specifically Sunni Lebanese. In addition to its resistance against Israel, the PLO launched 
internal military activities that defied the Lebanese National Army.  
The emergence of the PLO has created a state of fear among Christians in Lebanon which 
prompted their leaders to create their own military force aiming at protecting the Christian 
presence in Lebanon. Similarly, Druze and Shiite established their own military power. 
The materialization of the practices of "sectarian militias" was witnessed at the beginning 
of the 1975 civil war on the battle ground. Militia rule thus appeared in Lebanon as a 
result of threats. As one sect organized itself, others felt menaced. Consequently, they 
sought to establish their own security forces in their respective areas of influence. Muslim 
Sunnis organized their military capabilities as a reaction to Christian leadership and 
identity in Lebanon, and saw the arrival of the PLO on the Lebanese soil an opportunity 
to strengthen their authority. One other group was the Lebanese Arab Army (LAA), 
founded by Sunni Lebanese Army Lieutenant Ahmad El-Khatib in the Bekaa, in the wake 
of Civil War in 1976. Khatib mobilized more than 2000 soldiers and prompted them to 
quit the national Lebanese army.  Supported by Fatah, the main Palestinian militia, the 
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LAA fought on the Arab-Leftist side of the battle ground. The Tawhid ديحوتلا was a 
military wing of the Lebanese Islamic group, centered in Tripoli, and headed by Cheikh 
Said Chaaban. It also supported the Palestinian cause. 
After the ratification of the Taif agreement that ended the civil war and called for the 
disarmament of militias, with the exception of Hezbollah, Sunnis were satisfied with their 
status. Christians were marginalized.  
However Shiites communities’ power rose and their ascending popularity as a resistance 
to Israel grew.  As part of a regional equation, the relationship of Sunnis, represented by 
Rafik Hariri, with the Syrian regime, deteriorated, and the support the Assad regime for 
Hezbollah grew.  Following the assassination of Rafik Hariri in 2005 and with the 
speeding events in neighboring Syria in 2011, Sunni resentment towards Shiites 
internally, and regionally, matured. As a reaction, juvenile un-organized armed groups 
started emerging in the areas of Arsal and Tripoli and their sources of funding and their 
leaders stayed in the shadow of their militants.  
A similar movement, however more organized and ambitious came forward on the 
Lebanese scene. Sheikh Ahmad Al-Assir, initially the Imam of Bilal Bin Rabbah Mosque 
in the area of Sidon,  initiated a rebel armed Sunni group which aimed at challenging 
Iran’s and Shiites’ hegemony in Lebanon and the region in  the wake of the Syrian War.  
Militant for his Sunnis People “Ahel Al Sunna” Al-Assir was appointed Emir of the 
Emirate of Lebanon in the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)160 recognized globally 
as a terrorist radical Sunni group. His militancy started in 2012 with a series of speeches 
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during Friday masses criticizing Hezbollah’s practices in Lebanon and its interference in 
the Syrian crisis, which caused Sunnis bloodshed. His activities multiplied, he launched 
military clashes between his militants and Hezbollah. In June 2013 the Lebanese Army 
invaded his fortress in “Abra” where dozens of soldiers were killed and hundreds 
wounded but the battle ended with the capturing of his supporters and Al-Assir was not 
seen until August 2015, when he was captured by the Lebanese Security Forces at Beirut 
International Airport, when he was trying to escape from Lebanon.  
It is clear, these Sunni groups confronted the Lebanese army, contested Christians, 
Shiites, Alawites and Druze counterparts, created cantons where they imposed their rule 
of law and order and challenged the state. 
 
5.1.2 CHRISTIAN MILITIA  
Similarly to the Sunni’s, Christians also established their own armed forces. Although 
Christians trained fighters never aimed at operating outside the umbrella of the Lebanese 
army, however, after the Army division in 1973 between Christians and Muslims, and in 
reaction to the PLO’s military practices backed by Lebanese Sunni, Christians felt the 
need to defend their presence and authority.  Consequently in 1976 they organized 
themselves under the umbrella of the Lebanese Front.  
The Lebanese Front included the military wings of the Kataeb Party (Phalange), Tyous 
Team of Commandos, Al- Ahrar (Liberal National Party), Al-Tanzim, Al-Marada 
Brigade, the Guardians of the Cedars and others were supported by the USA, and Israel.  
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This led to an attempt to reestablish Maronite dominion in 1982 in the operation 
Gualilee161.  
The Lebanese Front which was founded by prominent leaders and thinkers such as 
Charles Malek, Fouad Efram Al-Boustani, Said Akl, and Maroun El-Khoury, Camil 
Chamoun, Pierre Gemayel, Boulos Naaman, Etienne Sakr, was declared to be the “the 
directory council for all Christian leadership in Lebanon”162.Over 25000 fighters joined 
the ranks and fought the Lebanese 15-years Civil War. The Lebanese Front was 
coordinated by the Lebanese Forces (LF), under the supervision of founder Bachir 
Gemayel. The LF conducted major battles against Palestinian aggressions and were able 
to rule Eastern Beirut, Zahle, and the Christian areas spreading from Bechare, Zghorta, 
Koura, Batroun, Jbeil, Keserouane, and Metn. 
Samir Geagea took jurisdiction over the LF, after the assassination of Bachir Gemayel in 
1982, following a series of internal clashes.  He then re-organized the militia and created 
a social welfare system, in his areas of dominance, namely, the Christian area known as 
Mount Lebanon.    Through military power and service provided to partisans, in addition 
to a mobilization based on the “Christian Cause”, the LF ran an autonomous state within 
the state in the areas known to have a predominantly Christian majority. 
In 1988, the “Elimination War” broke out between the Lebanese Army led by General 
Michel Aoun who refused the Taif agreement, and the LF led by Samir Geagea who 
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supported the Taif Agreement.  This ended after Syria took over Christian East Beirut 
and imposed the Taif Agreement.  
Consequently, the LF militia was dissolved, SamirGeagea was imprisoned after his 
relationship with the Syrian regime deteriorated, and General Michel Aoun was exiled to 
France. The Taif Agreement dissolved the Christian Militia. Since then, Christians have 
chosen to back the legitimate Lebanese armed forces and Lebanese army, even in the light 
of growing armament of Shiite and Sunni groups and their awareness of the growing risk. 
 
5.1.3 DRUZE MILITIA 
Similarly to how Christian Militias were created as a reaction to Sunni Militia, the Druze 
also felt the need to organize themselves. The exclusive Druze militia is the Popular 
Army163 operating under the umbrella of the Progressive Socialist Party PSP, located in 
the Chouf, Aley, and Al-Jabal, which had in its ranks approximately 5000 fighters in 
1980. Its weaponry was mainly donated by Syria and Palestine. The PSP fought during 
the civil war on the leftist side and achieved victory against the Lebanese Forces in a 
battle known as the Jabal Battle in 1984, which resulted in the wounding and 
displacement of thousands of Christians.  After the ratification of the Taif Agreement 
which called for the disarmament of militia, Head of PSP Walid Jumblat, who was not an 
opponent of the agreement, found it beneficial to accept it for several reasons:  
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Firstly, the agreement granted Druze two additional parliamentary seats,  
Secondly, the integration of its militiaman in the Lebanese Army brought economic 
privileges such as salaries, (which the PSP were not able to maintain after its channels of 
support were broken) 
Thirdly, it allowed Al-Jabal to preserve its somewhat autonomous administration.  
Similarly to other militia’s, the Druze had established earlier in the 80’s the Civil 
Administration of the Mountain (CAOM)164, that aimed at providing social services in 
Chouf, Aley, Iklim Al-Kharoub, and other predominantly Druze areas.  
Although the Druze seemed to have accepted the agreement, their acceptance emanated 
not from pure conviction, but was rather a pragmatic acceptance of the need to integrate 
and attain a “modus vivendi” with the Lebanese State165. The Druze preserved their areas 
of influence and currently continue to dominate their areas of demographic majority.  
 
5.1.4 SHIITE MILITIA  
Starting as a welfare movement for the Shiite, the Movement of the deprived or نيمورحملا, 
established by Imam Mussa As-Sader in 1974, aimed at providing educational and 
healthcare services for disadvantaged Shiites in the South. In the wake of the civil war, 
this social movement developed into a resilient militia group, Harakat Amal, recruiting 
thousands of Shiite militia men. In 1982, Iran-backed Hezbollah was established and 
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became involved in the armed struggle mainly against Israel however also opposing 
Amal. Hezbollah’s growing popularity among the Shiite community pushed Syria to 
interfere and end the Hezbollah-Amal struggle, thus unifying the Shiites cause.  
After the ratification of the Taif Agreement in 1990 that called for the disarmament of 
militias, Amal gave up on its weapons, dissolved its military wing, and integrated its 
partisans in administrative positions within Lebanon’s institutions. Hezbollah however 
was the only militia to keep its arms under the pretext of the Israeli threat. 
In 1997, an army of 3000166 combatants was formally established. Hezbollah succeeded 
to integrate the political life. In 1992, it gained its first Parliamentary seats and grew its 
authority over the Shiite community by establishing an autonomous welfare system that 
benefited Shiites in the areas of Shiite demographic dominance. In 2000, it was able to 
end the Israeli invasion of the south. This event increased its popularity. Paired with 
massive Iranian support and funding, Hezbollah was able to reach a high degree of 
independence within the Lebanese state.  
In 2006, it breached the National Dialogue agreements and went independently from the 
state to what is known as the July War against Israel. This cost Lebanon thousands of 
wounded and misplaced, and millions of dollars in infrastructure. In 2011, although it 
was among the signatories, Hezbollah also breached the Baabda Accord that called for 
the neutralization of Lebanon, by engaging military in the neighboring Syrian Crisis. The 
Syrian conflict which is categorized under the Sunni/Shiite conflict in the Middle East, 
induced a Sunni domestic reaction, which resulted in several terrorist bombings within 
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the southern suburbs of Beirut: Hezbollah’s area of influence.  Consequently, Hezbollah 
decided to ensure its own security separately from the state, and his loyalists turned the 
suburbs into a "fortress".  
Anyone entering Hezbollah areas are checked meticulously by its members who patrol 
the area in uniforms whilst carrying walkie-talkies. According to a Hezbollah guard, the 
suburb habitants are more comfortable this way and security is better maintained167. The 
concept of "self-protection" that Hezbollah has established, pushes one to question if this 
is not an attempt to build "a state within the state". 
Allies of Hezbollah have also acquired their benefits: althoughJabalMehsenAlawite area, 
which is part of the 10452 km2 land of Lebanon, and is part of the Larger Tripoli, located 
in the North of Lebanon, however, it is far from being Lebanese. It is "a tiny community 
in Lebanon which has long been a Syrian client state". The Alawite sect, "an offshoot of 
Shiite Islam", which represents 2% of the population in Lebanon, represents 99% of the 
population in Jabal Mehsen168 . They have gathered in one place and imposed their 
autonomy, but they do not live peacefully in their region because they are often in clashes 
with Sunni Muslims who live in their proximity Beb El Tebbeneh.  
Hezbollah has thus established an autonomous security system, and has taken action that 
challenges the presence of the Legitimate Lebanese Army and that benefits its allies in 
areas of predominantly Shiite majority such as the Bekaa, Hermel, Beirut Southern 
Suburb, and South of Lebanon. 
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The following section highlights how the impotence of the state to deliver on its 
fundamental objectives, has prompted sectarian faction to establish their autonomous 
foreign relations based on their need for foreign support, which has consequently led to 
Lebanon’s permeability and foreign policy dilemma.  
 
5.2. FAILURE TO ATTAIN A UNIFIED “FOREIGN POLICY” AND 
PRESERVE SOVEREIGNTY169 
Primordial sectarianism in Lebanon, lack of trust between Lebanese factions, and the 
weak state that is unable to govern, encouraged political leaders to look for external 
support, and thus enabled foreign interference. 
In countries made up of minorities, as is the case of Lebanon, social conflicts labeled as 
Protracted Social Conflicts (PSC) often arise, as in such competitive environments each 
minority has two concerns: One, fear of marginalization and two, struggle to dominate 
other minorities.  
As it is hard to rely on minority’s self-strength, the best way to approach these concerns 
is by seeking external support from foreign countries and groups that would enable the 
minority to empower itself, address possible absorption, or exercise control over others. 
Unfortunately, dependency on external support becomes a need that perpetuates 
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conflict170, shakes equilibrium and weakens the state. Hence, the surge of inter-communal 
grievances, and violent 171  PSCs, dormant during equilibrium times(as occurred in 
Lebanon for about thirty years with one interruption in 1958), usually reemerge. 
Lebanon’s permeability is the result of Lebanon’s internal divisions, where different 
sectarian Lebanese constituents seek foreign assistance and support in order to acquire an 
edge of authority over other sectarian communities. As previously discussed the failure 
of the consociational and centralized system in light of primordial sectarianism to enforce 
rule of law, protect rights and freedoms, and to provide security has prompted sects to 
behave autonomously.  
The absence of the state as a regulator has also created lack of trust among the Lebanese. 
Consequently, each sect aimed at establishing its own authority which could not be 
achieved without the sponsorship of a regional or super power (patron), who in return, 
expected precise positions and stances from their Lebanese client.   Lebanon has thus 
become permeable and was subject to defect of sovereignty. 
Each period in Lebanon’s history witnessed the mandate of a sectarian hegemony. 
Whether a sect aimed at strengthening its position as a reaction to a threat, or sought to 
empower its community through foreign support, sectarian leaders had to establish 
autonomous foreign proxy and diplomatic relations aligned with their supporters’ interest. 
Hence, Lebanese actors have failed to attain a common Foreign Policy by which all would 
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abide, represent, and act upon. Conflicts framed by the Sunni/Shiite confrontations, the 
position of Christians v/s Muslims, inter-state relations with neighboring countries mainly 
Israel, the Saudi/Iranian opposition, and the West/Islamists split have all had an impact  
on Lebanon’s sectarian factions’ behavior with regards to external events 
What is the reason preventing any kind of Foreign Policy agreement among different 
Lebanese actors? The following will establish the main cause behind the everlasting 
Foreign Policy dilemma is the failure of the centralized system to create trust and 
guarantee rights between different Lebanese factions, and which consequently results in 
inter-sectarian constituency’s attempt to reach autonomy and diplomatic prevalence.    
Foreign Policy conflicts are the extension of specific ideologies framing each party’s 
vision of Lebanon and its Foreign Relations, and are directly related to the survival, 
prevalence, and dominance of each sectarian community. The polarized identity along 
sectarian lines has shifted the debate from one over Foreign Policy, to one over the 
prevalence and supremacy of sectarian community through foreign support. Although 
each constituency at a period of the history militarized itself and sought power over the 
Lebanese state, none were able to acquire enough military and political influence to 
monopolize power.  
In this regard, it is of importance to note that Lebanon is characterized by:  
a. “The omnipresence of trans-national alliances of varying degrees of intensity and 
mobilization of external support for promoting domestic goals; 
b. The confrontational nature of the political rhetoric, especially in relation to the 
foreign affairs of the Lebanese state; 
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c. The various forms of unremitting foreign interventions in Lebanese politics”172.  
The following will outline the history of foreign relations of each sect and will highlight 
its position regarding major regional and international events.It will emphasize the 
divergent and autonomous position of Lebanese parties as part of their quest for foreign 
support.   
 
5.2.1. SUNNI FOREIGN RELATIONS 
Muslims of Lebanon, mainly Sunnis, identified themselves with neighboring Arab 
countries and Arab Leaders. Muslim ideology was based on Arabism, a criteria that 
rejects any type of pluralism, and considers diversity as a menace to the supreme 
“umma”173. It was imbedded in a nationalist frame and created a congruent political 
ideology and identity that rejected Lebanese nationalism and is responsive to external 
actors. This led to the creation of independent radical Islamic constituencies, which were 
supported by Arab powers such as Egypt, Syria, Iraq and KSA. Consequently, Muslims 
of Lebanon considered themselves part of the resilient movements fighting the Palestinian 
battle, the first cause the Muslim world had unanimously advocated. They have expressed 
this through supporting the PLO’s military actions on Lebanese soil. 
Sunnis of Lebanon have always been Syria’s ally in Lebanon. Their support of the Baath 
regime provided them with legitimate constitutional tools and illegitimate military 
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support to impose their hegemony in Lebanon for over a decade. However, after Sunni 
leader Rafik Hariri attempted to acquire a degree of independence and disassociate from 
the Baath Regime, led to his assassination in 2005, the relationship with the ruling regime 
in Syria deteriorated.  The regional Shiite-Alawite/Sunni conflict materialized in Lebanon 
in 2011, in the wake of the Syrian Crisis.  
The Syrian Crisis that started as an Arab uprising and ended up being a bloody civil war, 
created a schism between Sunni’s, who supported the so-called marginalized Sunni 
majority in Syria, and the Shiites, who considered the dominance of the Assaad Regime 
as an ultimate interest.  
The long carried resentment of Sunni’s towards the Syrian regime re-emerged with the 
beginning of the Syrian conflict especially in northern Lebanon and the Bekaa. This 
hatred is due to repetitive attempts to marginalize Sunnis politically and economically in 
bordering areas, the prosecution of Islamist activists, the empowerment of Hezbollah, and 
the assassination of Rafiq El-Hariri among other factors. The Sunni’s perception of the 
Syrian Conflict as being an opportunity to reinforce their influence is thus clear.   
This opportunity however is a double edged sword. On a regional level, it allows Sunnis 
to avenge the Syrian Regime; and on a domestic level, it allows Sunni’s to challenge 
Hezbollah. With their perceived victory in Syria, Islamists have allowed themselves to 
even challenge the Lebanese authorities, presenting themselves as a new, emerging, 
independent, powerful, non-state actor.   Alongside avenging the Syrian Regime and his 
domestic proxy’s, Islamists have chosen to apply the Hezbollah canton model to the 
northern area and the Bekaa area in Lebanon. Furthermore, they aspire to empower 
themselves militarily, thus creating a deterring balance in the face of Hezbollah and the 
104 
 
Lebanese army. Simultaneously with the Syrian conflict, a series of violent acts -
kidnapping, stealing, and murdering have been witnessed on the Lebanese territory. 
In the wake of the Arab spring, a sectarian-tribal civil war erupted in Yemen between 
Sunni and Houthis, a Yemeni Shiite rebel group hailing from northern Sa'ada organized 
under the leadership of Abdel-Malek al Houthi".  Perceiving it as a threat to its security 
and sovereignty, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) decided to intervene militarily to 
contain the uprising movement of the Shiite. It formed a coalition of Arab nations 
including Egypt, Jordan, Sudan, and Bahrain and initiated the “Decisive Storm” 
operation, which launched air strikes aimed at the defeat of the Iran backed Houthis 
movement. 
The Sunni, naturally, adhered to the decision of Saudi Arabia to declare war on the Shiite 
Houthis.Saad El-Hariri, the Sunni Leader, when asked about the Decisive Storm 
operation during his visit to the USA, described it as “very successful” and wished it 
would spill-over to other Arab countries like Syria174 .Sunni Premier Tamam Salam 
supporting KSA in a regional summit, announced that “This is a natural stance that stems 
from Lebanon’s Arab belonging and its keenness on the unity of the Arab nation and its 
ability to confront the challenges it is facing”. 
 
 
5.2.2. CHRISTIANS FOREIGN RELATIONS 
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hariri-wants-operation-decisive-storm-moved-to-syria.ashx 
105 
 
Historically, Christians, mainly Maronites were known for their close ties with France 
and the Vatican. After the independence of Lebanon, Christian ties with foreign powers 
were labeled as the Lebanese Christians relationship with the “West” including Europe 
and the USA. The West supported Christian against Muslim Lebanese attempts to 
marginalize Christians and consequently the Christians of Lebanon had to serve the 
Western interests in Lebanon.  
Lebanese were genuinely divided on numerous key concerns - one of which is the 
Palestinian cause 175 . Conversely to Muslims, Christians Lebanese called for the 
neutralization of Lebanon, the disarmament of the Palestinians on the Lebanese soil, the 
prevalence of the sole Lebanese identity, and the maintenance of Lebanon’s Sovereignty. 
Christian identity was clearly independent from the Arab World and even after the 
National Pact, their position was not aligned with that of the Arab World. 
With the illegitimate military empowerment of the PLO, Christians identified a violation 
of the Lebanese sovereignty and a weakening of their already precarious state.  
Lebanese Christian Nationalists (mainly under the leadership of Bachir Gemayel) opted 
for a radical behavior, seeking to re-establish the Lebanese sovereignty and preserve the 
Christian presence. This was only seen to be possible through militarization, and clear 
anti-Arabism stances equally distant from Israel and the Arab world. That is when the 
notion of the neutralization of Lebanon first emerged.  
Conversely, a leftist Arab front reallocated its capabilities behind the PLO, recognizing 
its military power, and collaborating with it on domestic issues. It also served as an 
extension to Abdel Nasser’s policies.  
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Similarly to their position regarding the Palestinian cause, Christians also called for the 
neutrality of Lebanon regarding the Syrian Crisis and other conflicts opposing major 
regional powers. Their position materialized with the adoption of the Baabda Accord, and 
with Lebanon’s abstention from voting in favor of an Arab Military Coalition against 
terrorism in the Arab League Summit for Ministers of Foreign Affairs in January 2016.  
 
5.2.3. SHIITE FOREIGN RELATIONS 
Since their early establishment, Shiites patron is Iran. Although Shiites took time to 
embark on the Arab journey of freeing Palestine from the “enemy”, however, to-date, 
they position themselves as the primary resistance against Israel. 
As Lebanese recognized their domestic conflicts in light of the Syrian war, and identified 
their respective victory with specific outcomes of the conflict, Shiites aimed at meeting 
Iran’s interest in extending its influence in the Arab world. 
Additionally, Hezbollah’s main concern was to preserve arms and status, this translated 
into an assessment of their position regarding the Syrian conflict. In fact, the Assaad 
regime, Iran’s main ally, provided Hezbollah with extensive support in an attempt to 
preserve the Shiite movement’s power, in return, Hezbollah fought alongside the regime 
in its strategic conflicts. 
In this sense, Hezbollah views its prevalence and consistency as directly related to the 
survival of the Assaad regime. Furthermore, given that Hezbollah is an extension of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, a country which is the principle ally of the Syrian regime, pushes 
the Shiite movement to feel more concerned and get more involved in defending Bachar 
El Assaad. 
107 
 
Similarly to any regional event having a sectarian dimension, Yemen’s events created a 
controversy in Lebanon. Sunnis, represented mainly by the Future Movement, (FM) 
supporting Saudi Arabia and, Shiites, mainly represented mainly by Hezbollah, 
supporting the Houthis movement and Iran.  
Despite the fact that the Yemen war coincided with rounds of mediations and dialogues 
between FM and Hezbollah, it did not prevent the two parties from adopting radical 
opposing attitudes pertaining to the “Decisive Storm” operation.  
Hezbollah attacked Saudi Arabia for her “Decisive Storm” intervention in Yemen. 
Covering Nasrallah’s speech of Tuesday May 5, 2015, The Daily Star newspaper reported 
him as saying that the operation resulted in a total defeat for Saudi Arabia who has not 
only failed to reestablish legitimacy, but also did not achieve any of their set goals176. 
Shiite Minister Hussein el- Hajj Hassan, one of Hezbollah’s representatives in the 
Cabinet, criticized Prime Minister Tammam Salam’s remarks at the Arab League 
Summit.  He stated their support for Saudi Arabia when he said that Lebanon approves 
of any act that preserves Yemen “sovereignty and territorial integrity”.  Hassan said that 
Nasrallah’s remarks do not represent the views of the Lebanese government or the 
viewpoint of all Lebanese - neither Lebanon’s official position, as they were not 
discussed or agreed upon by the Cabinet. He criticized Salam for supporting the Egyptian 
proposal to create a joint Arab force to counter terrorism; he also considers that Salam 
justifies the aggression against the Yemeni. 
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5.2.4. DRUZE FOREIGN RELATIONS 
The Druze community, who supports in its vast majority the Jumblat’s, forms alliance 
based on its sole interest - that of the Druze community security and autonomy. Druze 
had historically taken positions aligned with Arab positions. During clashes between 
Lebanese and the PLO, the Druze fought alongside the PLO. They also developed close 
ties with the Baath regime, even after it was publically held responsible for Kamal 
Jumblat’s assassination. It was not until 2005, that Walid Jumblat clearly expressed his 
opposition to the Al-Assad regime, and from then until 2011, he was part of the coalition 
supported by the USA and KSA.  During that period, he was a major player in conducting 
diplomatic meetings with Europeans and Americans calling for the resignation of the 
Assad regime backed President Lahoud177. 
After 2011, although Jumblat still expressed his resentment towards the Assad regime, 
he joined the Iranian- backed coalition in Lebanon, and since then has differentiated 
himself from Lebanese counterparts, by expressing blurry stances and unclear positions, 
only denouncing war atrocities in the region.   
Once more, Lebanese sects have taken autonomous positions pertaining to regional 
events with an aim to satisfy the regional sponsor, which provides channels and means of 
empowerment domestically. 
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The failure to achieve a common Foreign Policy has cost Lebanon its sovereignty and 
independence, and has resulted in inter-state conflicts. That is why, it is crucial to identify 
the main cause behind the Foreign Policy dilemma in order to find appropriate solutions 
to help Lebanon build a strong and independent state.   
In this article, it is empirically proven that Foreign Policy178 in Lebanon is constructed 
based on sectarian identities where each sect seeks its supremacy and complete power, 
and allows foreign actors to interfere in Lebanese affairs. Why? This is precisely due to 
the insecurity of these constituencies, their fear of marginalization, and the incapability 
of the state to address their grievances. Thus internal parties strive to seek foreign help to 
protect themselves, and thus in return have to compromise their state’s interest and align 
their behavior with the strategy of their protector.  
 
As it was previously demonstrated, each sectarian faction exercises its influence in a well-
defined area. Below highlights the segregation per region per sect. 
 
 
5.3.GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION AND AUTONOMOUS RULE 
The interesting observation that one can draw is the congruence between the sectarian 
militia’s areas of influence and its respective demographic dominance. Throughout 
history, each sectarian militia developed its operations, enhanced the mobilization of 
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partisans, and strengthened its autonomy within a well-defined area where it had a 
demographic dominance. 
Autonomy is defined as a private sphere proper to a cluster which have full jurisdiction 
over decisions pertaining to its security and welfare, independently of any outer 
interference179. Another definition identifies autonomy as “a device to allow an ethnic 
group or other groups claiming a distinct identity to exercise direct control over important 
affairs of concerns to them while allowing the larger entity to exercise those powers which 
are the common interest of both sections”180. 
Thus, in Lebanon, we can talk about a de-facto partition, where each sect acquired 
jurisdiction over an area of their respective demographic dominance. Political leaders’ 
aimed to meet their “clients” aspirations. They thus created their respective cantons, each 
powerful in its own area, and denying completely the legitimacy of the unitary state itself. 
Figure.5.3.1 below shows the sectarian militia autonomy within each area without any 
specific time frame. In the northern areas of Tripoli and Akkar, and the southern areas of 
Sidon and South Bekaa, (where the majority of population is Sunni), Sunni militias have 
been established.  
In the eastern area of North Bekaa and in the South, Shiites militia Hezbollah have 
established an autonomous state.  
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Similarly, the Druze has reinforced their fortress in the areas of Chouf and Al- Jabal.  
Christians, on the other hand, took control over Mount Lebanon.  
As for Beirut, Christians, Sunnis and Shiites all got their respective share of the capital. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3.1: Map of historical to-date sectarian militia cantons over areas of 
respective demographic dominance181. 
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This sectarian distribution among the Lebanese regions as mentioned previously is clearly 
translated in the Lebanese electoral law and the distribution of parliamentary seats. Table 
5.3.2 shows the distribution of parliamentary seats per district per sect182: 
Table 5.3.2:Distribution of parliamentary seats per district per sect 
  Christians 
& 
Minorities 
Sunni Shiite & 
Alawites 
Druze Total 
North (Akkar, Diniyeh, Minieh, 
Tripoli) 
5 11 2 0 18 
Mount Lebanon (Becharreh, 
Zghorta, Koura, Batroun, Jbeil, 
Keserouane, Metn, Baabda) 
&Zahleh 
33 1 4 1 39 
East Beirut 5 0 0 0 5 
West Beirut 3 5 1 1 10 
Beirut Southern Suburb 2 1 1 0 4 
Jabal (Chouf, alley) &Jezzine 10 2 0 4 16 
Saida 0 2 0 0 2 
South (Tyre, zahrani, Marjeyoun, 
Nabatiyah, BintJbeil) 
2 1 14 1 18 
Bekka (West Bekaa, Rachaya, 
Hermel, Baalbak) 
4 4 7 2 15 
Total 64 27 29 8 128 
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The Lebanese political system failed to guarantee security. Security defect is thus 
translated by the recurrent emergence of sectarian armed militias. “Militias were de-facto 
ruling parties in the areas they controlled183”. Ghassan Tueini mentioned the “de-facto 
situation where local self-appointed authorities exercised power but never claimed 
legitimacy”184. Additionally, Habib Malik stated, “in Lebanon the society, not the state, 
is consistently the stronger and more durable of the two”185. On another note, Simon 
Haddad quotes Samir Khalaf where he acknowledges that: 
 
“since 1975, territorial identities have been ceaselessly redefined and that forms 
of solidarity and social affiliation based on class or other secular ideologies 
proved more distant and abstract than confessional identities, without which 
individuals and groups are literally rootles, nameless, and voiceless”, to then add 
that “by 1990 more than 1.2 million Lebanese, about 30 per cent of the total 
population, had been uprooted from their homes and communities (Charif 1994). 
Massive population shifts, accompanied by the reintegration of displaced groups 
into more homogeneous, self-contained and exclusive spaces, have also 
reinforced communal solidarity. Confessional `cleansing’ of geographical areas 
and the consequent physical separation have led to increased social division and 
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the fragmentation of political culture, constraining political and social 
integration in the country”186. 
 
In the above chapter, this thesis has demonstrated that in light of the impotence of the 
state to maintain security, each sect has founded its own militia and consequently, has 
established its own rule in its area of predominant demographic majority.  
Then it has proved that each militia has established autonomous foreign relations based 
on Patron/Clients relationship. Lastly, it has highlighted the congruence between 
geographic distribution, sectarian majority, and autonomy.   
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION: THE FEDERALIST RESPONSE TO 
THE LEBANESE DILEMMA 
 
In analyzing socio-political interactions in pluralistic and mosaic societies, it is noted that 
there is an  “ intrinsic fear of 'aloneness,' the flight from insecurity which causes a great 
clustering into separateness that will, it is thought, improve, assure, or extend each group's 
power or place, or keep it safe or safer from the power, threat, or hostility of others”.187 
The world counts a variety of plural/mosaic states – ethnic, cultural, sectarian- that 
embraces a variety of minorities. These minorities might sense an extent of 
disappointment vis-à-vis their status and hence, aspire for a degree of change. While these 
groups affiliate with their communities rather than their state as a whole, continual and 
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all-enveloping conflicts arise between sub-national identity/sub-national identity, and 
sub-national identity/national identity188. 
As Geertz acknowledges, two drives regulate the behavior of the people of a state: the 
first, is the aim to be recognized, noticed within the frame of the identity, here identity is 
a means of assertion. The second motive is the pragmatic aim that targets domestic 
welfare policies, social justice, and the role in international politics189.  
As shown is Table 6.1 below, sub-national constituencies’ aspirations range from 
identification, admission, and involvement to division, independence, and self-rule taking 
into consideration the geographical circumstances190. 
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Table 6.1: Minority Group Objectives 
Aspiration Type of Associated Policy 
Demands 
Political Arrangement Sought 
Independence New state transfer to neighboring 
state 
Recognized secession 
 
Autonomy 
Control of Minority Region,  
Devolution,  
Confederalism,  
Federalism,  
Regional Autonomisim,  
Regional Administrative 
Decentralization 
Separation Exemption from Societal Norms Community Autonominism 
Participation Power-sharing input into Policy 
Making 
Proportional Representation,  
Ethnic quotas  
 
Access 
No-discrimination,  
Advancement Opportunities,  
Special Subsidies 
Affirmative action, 
Anti-Discrimination laws,  
Economic Development Assistance 
Recognition Acknowledgment of group’s 
existence,  
Respect for group’s special 
attributes 
Official language or religion 
special, Cultural institutions 
 
 
Lebanon is no exception to the rule. It is formed of diversified, self-determined, sectarian 
groups.  As proven, each sectarian community has acquired authority and a degree of 
autonomy over well-defined geographical areas where these minorities have a respective 
demographic dominance.  
Pluralistic/mosaic countries, mainly those which were unable to follow a process of state 
and nation building, and which were unable to address sub-communities’ aspirations, are 
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subject to Protracted Social Conflict (PSC). In these countries, consensus is unachievable, 
lack of trust prevails amongst citizens, and thus stability of the structure is unattainable191. 
We talk about precarious states. That is precisely the case of Lebanon. Insecurities and 
threat of marginalization in light of the absence of a de jure guarantee of existence, 
prevalence, active role, and distinctiveness, have led to PSC’s. 
Protracted Social Conflict needs long-term strategies as it touches every aspect of the 
state; territory, society, political system. Addressing institutions solely is not enough 
while tackling PSC192.  It is crucial to note that whenever a state cannot manage its PSC, 
demands and aspirations of the various social groups, ranging from recognition to 
autonomy start ascending the scale, as shown in Figure 6.2 below.  
193 
Figure 6.2: Minority Group Aspirations 
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In such cases, and mainly whenever the demands of the groups skew towards autonomy 
and independence, a unitary state gradually loses its ability to sustain its stability, unless 
it is able to disregard these demands based on a consensus with the various other groups 
– the case of authoritarian regimes.  In addition, demands starting with the bottom of the 
spectrum, like recognition and access, if ignored, or not addressed properly especially in 
a unitary state, might be pushed further due to dissatisfaction, and demands for 
autonomy194. 
In Lebanon specifically, the PSC is an enduring characteristic that pushes one to question, 
not how to solve the conflict, but rather how to manipulate it in a manner that enforces 
equilibrium, alleviate tensions, and create positive dynamics between different 
constituencies. If we were to apply the above dynamics to Lebanon, one would suggest 
that the best way to address demands of various groups and manage the PSC positively 
is to shift from a unitary state which is deficient in pluralistic and mosaic societies, to a 
system, whereby each constituency is able to reach full citizenship, cultural, sectarian, 
and geographical satisfaction. 
Three forms of governmental formulas could be considered; 
First, Administrative Decentralization defined as “where a central government 
establishes basic policies in all areas, but then devolves the power to administer these 
policies to lower levels of government, typically regional or municipal government”195.  
                                                 
194 Ibid, P.19 
195Kymlicka, W, “Is Federalism a viable alternative to secession?”.In Theories of secession. P. 117 
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Second, Federalism defined as “an organization of government where powers and 
responsibilities are both divided and shared between the federal (national) Government 
and the “constituent unit” (state, province, regional and local) governments 
Third is Confederation defined as ”where two or more sovereign countries agree to 
coordinate economic and military policy, and so each devolves the power to administer 
these policies to a supranational body composed of delegates of each country”196. 
The first option, administrative decentralization offers no integrated solution to the 
Lebanese dilemma, especially in light of primordial identities. Although it helps 
reestablish equilibrium between regions in Lebanon, which results in equitable 
development, it does not however tackle issues of identity and distinctiveness. Based on 
the analyses conducted in this thesis that highlights the deficits in Legitimacy, Rights and 
freedoms, Security and Sovereignty, this option should be eliminatedas it only addresses 
problems of economic equity. 
The third option, Confederalism, is not applicable in Lebanon. Although the sectarian 
schism seems very deep, there remains consensus among Lebanese that the Lebanese 
entity is definitive and its 10452 Km2 territory is not to be reconsidered regardless of 
internal and external conflicts.  
 
The second option, Federalism, although subject to challenges, seems to offer applicable 
and adaptable solutions to the Lebanese dilemma. Federalism is a solution that was first 
                                                 
196Ibid, 117 
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proposed in 1977 as a reaction to raising Arabism, Nasserism, and Islamic Arabism, at 
the Retreat of Sayidat Al-Bir197 where the Lebanese Front alongside the Maronite cleric 
and intellectuals like Charles Malik recognized the right of each religious constituency to 
distinctiveness within the Lebanese entity.   
The challenges that prevented the adoption of Federalism in Lebanon are: 
Since Federalism was firstly proposed by Christians, scholars, mainly those of Arab 
background, rejected the idea of Federalism, describing it as a Christian project seeking 
Christian’s ultimate interest without analyzing the Federalism solution.  
There is a misconception that Federalism is a step ahead of secession that challenges the 
10452 Km2 and was believed to be a threat to the Lebanese entity. There is often a 
misconception in Lebanon that Federalism leads to Partition. 
Integrationists argue against Federalism claiming that Lebanon is a small territory and 
dividing it into smaller rather independent regions could damage its economy. Advocates 
of the unitary state, consider that geographic distribution after the rural exodus, makes it 
impossible to draw geographic borders that are congruent with sectarian presence.  
 
Building on the fact that sectarian communities have acquired the capabilities of a state 
within well-defined geographic areas, and a situation of a de-facto autonomy has been 
witnessed in these areas, it is assumed that this situation is irreversible, and a suitable 
solution that embraces the current situation is needed.   
 
                                                 
197Rowayheb, M, 2006, “Lebanese Militia: A New Perspective”. Taylor &Francis.P. 312 
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Federalism is a political system widespread in the world and designed primarily to better 
manage governance issues that may emerge in multicultural, multilingual or multi-
sectarian societies, like the case of Lebanon, from many perspectives. 
 
What are the opportunities presented by this model that answers the deficiencies 
discussed in this thesis, and the challenges discussed herein. 
First, in matters pertaining to legitimacy and rule of law, Federalism helps re-establish 
legitimacy of the state and its capability to enforce the rule of law. One of the basic 
characteristics of the Federal state is that it puts the Government in direct contact with the 
people, since local committees have the authority to legislate based on local needs. These 
committees are directly elected by the people which enhances the democratic process and 
accountability. This will lead the people to trust their Government and consequently, will 
help the latter to enforce the rule of law. Federalism is thus a system that is applied 
bottom-up. 
Second, in matters pertaining to rights and freedoms, Federalism allows for a degree of 
autonomy, since it grants regional authorities a de jure right to self-rule on issues relating 
to education, economy, social security, environment, and others laws and policies. Such 
an advantage will build a feeling a security among distinct communities, which will lead 
to peaceful inter-sectarian communities’ interactions and will help build trust.  Lebanon 
is characterized by its diversity and freedoms. Whenever these freedoms are 
compromised upon, Lebanon losesthe characteristics that differentiate it from its 
surrounding.  It is of crucial importance to note that if adopted, federalism should not 
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allow for any faction within its autonomous area to conduct practices which violate 
universally recognized human rights under the pretext of freedoms and distinctiveness.  
Third, in matters pertaining to security, Federalism allows for autonomous, regional 
police and public security officials. Thus, members of sectarian communities will not turn 
towards forming their own militia, but rather, will integrate partisans into the Lebanese 
regional police. Consequently, the gap between sects and the government with regards to 
security practices will be abolished. 
 
Fourth and lastly, pertaining to external relations; After Federalism has provided the 
framework and means to enforce the rule of law, protect rights and freedoms, and 
maintain security, sectarian communities will no longer need to turn to foreign actors to 
safeguard their rights within the Lebanese entity, nor would they enhance their proxy 
relations.  The appeal to foreign actors will be at a minimum. As a result, the Lebanese 
Government will be able to reach a consensus over Lebanon’s position within the 
International System, namely, neutralization. Neutralization, mainly armed 
neutralization, is a prerequisite to Federalism as it leads to constructive interventionism. 
Addressing the first challenge, the general belief that Federalism is a Christian idea could 
be resolved by conducting academic campaigns aiming at raising awareness about the 
flexibility of the Federal model and the possibility to tailor adaptable processes which 
benefits all sectarian factions in Lebanon. 
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In the same manner, the second challenge, which is the belief that federalism means 
partition, could be addressed, by explaining scientifically and empirically that Federalism 
is rather unity in diversity and is a preventive measure for partition. 
Lastly, the third challenge, that of the demographic/geographic distribution, could be 
resolved by the appointment of an ombudsman representing minorities in districts. 
Ombudsmen will be the representatives of minorities in the local Government and will 
be responsible to safeguard minorities’ rights. In addition, federalism does not necessarily 
need to be geographic. It is a flexible formula that could be tailor-made to fit the needs of 
Lebanon and its particularity.  
 
This research paper demonstrates first that sectarian affiliations are of a primordial nature. 
Thus, they are core to any political, societal, or cultural behavior. Additionally, they 
cannot be eliminated or reconstructed.  Second, it analyzed the consociational and 
centralized formula and verified how it led to Governmental deadlocks and inequitable 
distribution of resources, which eventually perpetuated sectarian tensions. Third, it 
highlighted the failure of the state to deliver on a state’s basic fundamentals, in light of 
primordial sectarianism. This failure has been translated into issues pertaining to rule of 
law, basic human and citizen’s rights, security, and sovereignty, and has prompted 
sectarian communities to autonomously acquire state capabilities, and consequently to 
create their own areas of authority that overlap with their areas of demographic 
dominance.  
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Therefore the problem behind the precarious condition of the Lebanese state and the 
tensions among the different sectarian factions lies not in sectarianism itself, but rather, 
in the political system. The solution to Lebanon’s sustained turmoil is to reform the 
system and adopt a formula that aims at establishing trust between Lebanese factions on 
the one hand, enforce Governmental institutions, and earn the trust of citizens in the 
Lebanese state, while preserving each sectarian community’s distinctiveness from each 
other.   
The solution to Lebanon's sustained turmoil is the reform of the political system from 
unitary to federal. Federalism is a system that has been proven successful in many 
pluralistic societies. This is because it combines De Jure sectarian self-rule in areas, with 
sectarian shared rule at the level of the central authority. It is able to grant each group a 
degree of distinctiveness and autonomy, it allows each faction to benefit from an absolute 
power over its own values and cultural patterns, it prevents deadlocks on micro issues 
even in light of divergent views pertaining to macro-national issues at the level of the 
central authority. Consequently, Federalism helps in building trust among communities, 
alleviating tension, and preventing any attempt of secession.  
Since the socio-political or socio- historical considerations of the 18 religious 
communities that make up the fabric of Lebanon are not the same, Federalism remains a 
unifying solution to the benefit of the whole society. It also re-establishes state authority 
and thus ameliorates the precarious situation that has befallen the Lebanese state.  
Federalism could be considered as the best suited deterrent to any prospect of civil war, 
and could eventually provide a framework within which the Lebanese state could regain 
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its legitimacy, enforce its institutions, protect the rights of distinctiveness of each 
sectarian community, guarantee the Lebanese army as the sole armed force on the 
Lebanese soil, and unify the position of Lebanon within the international system and 
safeguard its sovereignty. 
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